Organizations and their external context: Impressions across time and space by Maas, A.J.J. (Ron)
Erasmus University Rotterdam (EUR)
Erasmus Research Institute of Management
Mandeville (T) Building
Burgemeester Oudlaan 50
3062 PA Rotterdam, The Netherlands
P.O. Box 1738
3000 DR Rotterdam, The Netherlands
T +31 10 408 1182
E info@erim.eur.nl
W www.erim.eur.nl
478
R
O
N
 M
A
A
S
  -  O
rg
a
n
iza
tio
n
s a
n
d
 th
e
ir e
x
te
rn
a
l co
n
te
x
t
Organizations and their 
external context
Impressions across time and space
RON MAAS
Ron Maas (1987) has obtained bachelor degrees in both Chemistry and Economics and Business 
Economics from the University of Utrecht in 2012. He then did a masters’ degree in Strategic Management 
and a research master in Business at the Rotterdam School of Management, Erasmus University 
Rotterdam, both of which he completed in 2014. In September 2014, he started his PhD at the department 
of Strategy & Entrepreneurship, at the Rotterdam School of Management, Erasmus University Rotterdam, 
under the supervision of Professor Pursey Heugens and Professor Taco Reus.
His research focuses on how organizations are conditioned by their external non-market environment. 
Ron has published in the Journal of Management Studies, and presented his work at various conferences, 
including the Academy of Management, the Strategic Management Society, The European Academy of 
Management and the Global Strategy & Emerging Markets Conference. Ron is continuing his career as a 
lecturer of Strategic Management and International Business at the University of Western Australia
The Erasmus Research Institute of Management (ERIM) is the Research School (Onderzoekschool) in  
the field of management of the Erasmus University Rotterdam. The founding participants of ERIM are the 
Rotterdam School of Management (RSM), and the Erasmus School of Economics (ESE). ERIM was founded 
in 1999 and is ocially accredited by the Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences (KNAW). The 
research undertaken by ERIM is focused on the management of the firm in its environment, its intra- and 
interfirm relations, and its business processes in their interdependent connections.
The objective of ERIM is to carry out first rate research in management, and to o¡er an advanced doctoral 
programme in Research in Management. Within ERIM, over three hundred senior researchers and PhD 
candidates are active in the di¡erent research programmes. From a variety of academic backgrounds and 
expertises, the ERIM community is united in striving for excellence and working at the forefront of creating 
new business knowledge.
ERIM PhD Series 
Research in Management
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Organizations and their External Context: 
Impressions across time and space 
 
Organizations and their external context: 
Impressions across time and space 
 
 
Organisaties en hun externe context: 
Indrukken door tijd en ruimte 
 
 
 
 
 
Thesis 
 
to obtain the degree of Doctor from the 
Erasmus University Rotterdam 
by command of the 
rector magnificus 
 
Prof. dr. R.C.M.E. Engels 
 
and in accordance with the decision of the Doctorate Board. 
 
 
The public defence shall be held on 
Thursday 23 May 2019 at 1530 hrs 
 
by 
 
Arnoldus Joseph Josephus Maas 
 
 
 
Doctoral Committee 
 
Doctoral dissertation supervisor(s):  
Prof. dr. P.P.M.A.R. Heugens 
Prof. dr. T.H. Reus 
 
Other members:   
Prof. dr. Chris Marquis 
dr. Flore Bridoux 
dr. Mirko Benischke 
Prof. dr.  Slangen 
dr. Rian Drogendijk 
dr. Brian Pinkham 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Erasmus Research Institute of Management – ERIM 
The joint research institute of the Rotterdam School of Management (RSM)   
and the Erasmus School of Economics (ESE) at the Erasmus University Rotterdam 
Internet: www.erim.eur.nl 
 
ERIM Electronic Series Portal: repub.eur.nl/ 
 
ERIM PhD Series in Research in Management, 478 
ERIM reference number: EPS-2019-478-S&E 
ISBN 978-90-5892-549-7 
© 2019, Ron Maas 
 
Design:  PanArt, www.panart.nl 
 
This publication (cover and interior) is printed by Tuijtel on recycled paper, BalanceSilk® 
The ink used is produced from renewable resources and alcohol free fountain solution. 
Certifications for the paper and the printing production process: Recycle, EU Ecolabel, FSC®, ISO14001. 
More info: www.tuijtel.com 
 
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means 
electronic  
or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by any information storage and retrieval system, without 
permission  
in writing from the author. 
 
I 
 
 
PREFACE 
 
To me, the process of finishing a dissertation feels a bit like getting married. 
Maybe it‘s because of a recency bias since I just got married, but I think there are a lot of 
parallels to be found. Both are celebrated milestones in a lifelong trajectory, yet the actual 
differences between pre- and post-milestone are more practical than substantial. Both 
involve headache-inducing paperwork to finalize. Both result from getting to know a 
particular topic (or person) as well as anyone in the world. And both leave me completely 
convinced that the choices that brought me to this place are the right ones. The main 
difference is that while getting married is strictly a two-person job, finishing this 
dissertation involved a lot more people. As such, there are several people I would like to 
thank that made this possible.  
First and foremost, I am extremely grateful to my two co-promoters, Professor 
Pursey Heugens and Professtor Taco Reus. Ever since I was in my early MPhil days, even 
before I started my PhD, they have been with me every step of the way. Thank you for 
guiding me towards promising research topics when I was enthusiastic about everything, 
while still giving me the freedom to pursue my own interests. Thank you for the 
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relationship that goes beyond professional goal achievement, and hope we can continue to 
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I also want to thank several of my colleagues and co-authors that helped make 
this possible. Agnieszka, my office wife, thank you for putting up with me all those years, 
and helping to vent all the frustrations that are inherent to academia. Ilaria, my meat 
buddy, thank you for all the good talks that we had and making sure I ate enough steaks. 
Arjen, my beer buddy, thank you for all the great discussions we had, where we never 
failed to conceptualize at least five new papers while drinking as many beers. Omar, Stefan 
and Timo, my partners in crime from day one, thank you for all the shenanigans and the 
good times we had. And of course Riccardo, so similar to me that you could have been my 
brother, thank you for more things than I could ever list here, and I am really glad we‘ve 
become such close friends. I also want to thank all the other great people both inside and 
outside of RSM for all the insights and memories, including: Alina, Chris, Guus, Hendra, 
Jasmien,  Jiachen, Jitse, Lance, Laura, Michael, Michel, Mirko, Radina, René, Tatjana, 
Thijs and everyone else.  
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CHAPTER 1 
 
ORGANIZATIONS AND THEIR EXTENRAL CONTEXT:  
IMPRESSIONS ACROSS SPACE AND TIME 
 
General introduction 
We are all products of our environment. Every interaction we have, whether it's through 
individuals, groups or organizations, plays a role in shaping our identity and outlook. Our 
surroundings dictate the type of behavior that is expected or tolerated, the ideas we are 
exposed to, and the scope of decisions available to us. Our context predisposes us towards 
making certain choices and decisions, and traversing particular paths. As a result, people 
frequently exhibit commonalities based on which external influences they have been 
exposed to. But at the same time, individuals within a given society are not homogenous 
clones, and differences across people exist. In effect our contexts prescribes a particular set 
of traits and behaviors, but does so in a non-binding way. For example, the majority of 
fans for a particular sports team stem from their local community, as people raised within 
this community are more predisposed towards supporting their local team. Without the role 
of context, fandom would have a more homogenous distribution across the globe. Yet not 
everyone in the local community will be a supporter of the team, leaving room for freedom 
in the choices that are made, given a particular set of options. 
When it comes to the role of context, organizations are no different. 
Organizations are positioned in a broader environment that dictates their available 
opportunities, restrictions, and pathways to success (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). This 
broader environment goes beyond the role of an organization‘s direct competitors, 
consumers, or industry. The state of the economy, the local laws and customs, the 
availability of certain resources or skilled laborers, and cultural norms are all examples of 
external factors that can have a significant impact on organizational decision making and 
how these decisions turn out. As a consequence, strategic decisions that result in improved 
organizational performance in one setting can have the opposite effect in another setting. 
For example, the long-term orientation within a society or its intellectual property 
protection can be influential in how much organizations should invest in research and 
development (Chrisman & Patel, 2012; Owen-Smith & Powell, 2001), while the risk 
tolerance of a society will play a role in determining how the stock market will respond to 
internationalization plans (Cavusgil & Knight, 1997). A thorough understanding of how 
the environment affects organizations is therefore critical to evaluating organizational 
decision making and their outcomes. 
The majority of studies approach the role of context from the perspective of the 
organization, through identifying the strategies that best align with the organizations‘ 
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environment. But context also influences organizations through dictating the scope of 
decisions that organizations have available to them, and (dis)-incentivizing certain 
decisions by facilitating or impeding various choices. (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Weber 
& Glynn, 2006; Zucker, 1983). Yet studies frequently limit their treatment of this 
mechanism as a limitation of their findings or a potential avenue for future research. This 
is understandable, as singular studies can rarely engage in the cross-contextual analyses 
that are necessary to account for all contextual influences. However, actual follow up 
studies are rare, and citing prior findings without acknowledging the contextual limitations 
unfortunately does occur. Implicitly, there appears to be an underestimation of how context 
constrains organizational decision making. 
 This poses certain challenges in our field. When the incentives for organizational 
decisions vary across countries, empirical findings are no longer generalizable without an 
understanding of how this would affect the results. In addition, the environment generally 
changes over time, and omitting the role of context can cayse misleading future 
suggestions even for the originally studied setting. Finally, neglecting the role of context 
can lead to biased results, as it can cause empirical findings to be misattributed to the 
wrong underlying causes and mechanisms.  
 In this dissertation, I therefore set out strengthen and develop our existing 
theorizing by generating insights that emphasize how the external context affects strategic 
decision making across organizations. While most studies that do examine contextual 
influences account for them from a contemporary perspective, these conditions change 
over time, and past conditions also continue to exert a lasting influence on how 
organizations behave (Marquis & Tilcsik, 2013; Stinchcombe, 1965). For 
comprehensiveness I therefore chose to account for contextual influences from both 
current and past conditions in my dissertation. By doing so my, work primarily draws upon 
and contributes to two complementary theoretical lenses: environmental imprinting theory 
from a historical perspective, and institutional theory from a contemporary perspective. 
According to imprinting theory, when organizations are established they tend to 
develop attributes that reflect the predominant characteristics of the period they were 
founded in, through a process known as imprinting (Marquis & Tilcsik, 2013; 
Stinchcombe, 1965). This occurs because of their liability of newness, which is the notion 
that newly founded firms suffer some disadvantages when comparised to established firms 
(Freeman, Carroll & Hannan, 1983). First, they have limited capabilities, resources and 
connections available to them, since these all take time to develop. Second, since they have 
no prior operational history, they still lack reputation and legitimacy in the broader market 
(Singh, Tucker, House, 1986). Other stakeholders will therefore not yet know what to 
expect from the organization, and their lack of prior accomplishments makes them a risky 
investment. Moreover, recently founded organizations operate in a context where they 
might lack experience, and are therefore potentially unfamiliar with the optimal way in 
which to act and behave.  
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 Mirroring the practices of reputed incumbents helps organizations in such 
circumstances to overcome several of these problems: when organizations conform to 
expectations it will lower the perceived risk factor of the organization in the eyes of other 
stakeholders, making them more willing to engage in collaborations and partnerships. 
Simultaneously, copying the perceived best practices for a given context can help 
organizations to reduce their own uncertainty through vicarious learning (Haveman, 1993). 
But after organizations have chosen a structure to adapt, decided which capabilities they 
wish to developed, and have settled in their routines, they become slow to adjust 
(Levinthal & March, 1993; Nelson & Winter, 1982; Szulanski, 1996). Change tends to be 
difficult, time-consuming and costly for organizations, so the initial decisions can have 
lasting consequences on organizational outcomes. As a consequence, imprinting theory 
predicts that the time of organizational founding is one of the most influential periods for 
evaluating how organizational outcomes are conditioned by their surroundings.  
Complementary to imprinting is institutional theory, a rich body of literature that 
incorporates contemporary external factors in its theorizing. According to institutional 
theory, society is organized through man-made rules and laws that are known as 
institutions. These institutions constitute a set of behaviors or outcomes that are deemed as 
appropriate, and organizations that abide by these norms are conferred legitimacy 
(DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Meyer & Rowan, 1977, Scott, 1987). Organizations that are 
granted legitimacy are rewarded with resources and opportunities, while those that lack 
legitimacy are penalized (Toma, Dubrow & Hartley, 2005), and so the success and survival 
of organizations is contingent on the level of legitimacy they manage to achieve (Meyer, 
Scott & Deal, 1981). Due to this dependency, institutions can (dis)-incentivize certain 
behaviors, and generate conformity and homogeneity across different organizations. This 
homogeneity can subsequently serve as a useful tool for predicting organizational behavior 
based on the institutions in their context. 
Prior work in this field has shown contextual influences that stem from a variety 
of sources, most commonly through differences across cultural norms (Hoecklin, 1995; 
Hofstede, 1983; Shenkar, 2001). But other characteristics of the external environment also 
affect the appropriateness of certain organizational decisions, such as resource scarcity 
(Yasai-Ardenkai, 1989), institutional quality (Oliver, 1997) or institutional complexity 
(Greenwood, Raynard, Kodeih, Micelotta & Lounsbury, 2011). Research has shown that 
organizations need to adapt their decision making to the particulars of the environment 
they are operating in (Oliver, 1991), and that their strategic decisions tend to be more 
successful when they do so (Clemens & Douglas, 2005).  
This notion of adapting organizational decision making to the circumstances of 
the environment is particularly important in the context of international business (IB). This 
field of study attempts to answer the question how organizations can successfully manage 
their operations across different countries. A key premise of this field is that different 
contexts require different approaches in order to be successful, and that differences in 
context can be difficult to overcome when internationalizing (Ghemawat, 2001; Johanson 
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and Vahlne, 1977). This led to the mapping of variations in business settings and practices 
across countries (Hofstede, 1983), and gave rise various operationalizations of cross-
national distance (Berry, Guillen and Zhou, 2010).   
Building on these ideas identified the need for theorizing about emerging market 
economies (EMEs) that was distinct from the common Western-centered approach (e.g. 
Arnold & Quelch, 1998; Khanna & Palepu, 1997). This was driven in part by the 
increasing prevalence of EMEs on the global market space, which ran contrary to the 
expectations of prior IB literature (Bonaglia, Goldstein & Matthews, 2007; Khavul, Pérez-
Nordtvedt & Wood, 2010; Tsai & Eisingerich, 2010). According to classical theorizing, 
firms from EMEs were supposedly disadvantages vis-à-vis firms from developed markets, 
due to differences in economics, institutional, educational and technological factors that 
would render them uncompetitive (e.g. Dunning, 2001; Johanson & Vahlne, 1977). But 
empirical evidence presented a different outcome, and firms from EMEs are now some of 
the biggest players in the global market (UNCTAD, 2015). This has led to the 
development of strategies that are geared towards specifically to doing business in EMEs, 
but EMEs are frequently grouped together will little regard for their underlying 
differences. As noted by Ramammurti (2009), this was especially jarring for the emerging 
market context, as countries that belong to this category are frequently nothing alike, and 
diverge widely on factors such as cultural background, political systems, economic growth 
and quality of institutions. To shed light on the consequences of this heterogeneity across 
various emerging markets, I therefore looked at how different country level effects 
generated differences in firm internationalization behavior for my first project. 
 
First project - Differences in the emerging market context 
My goal for this project was to enhance the literature on the rapidly growing 
internationalization of EMEs in order to better understand the discrepancy between classic 
internationalization theorizing and current empirical findings. Most of the prior work in 
this area emphasizes the factors that distinguish EMEs from more developed economies. 
However, several EME firms are enjoying considerable international success while others 
are less fortunate, and the prevalence of emerging markets in the global strongly varies. 
Much less work has been done on explaining these different outcomes across EMEs. My 
interest lied in unpacking why this was the case. I therefore focused my analysis on 
identifying the underlying factors that influence the participation of EMEs on the 
international market, and that could lead to a differentiation in internationalization 
behavior both across and within countries. 
To identify the factors that influence participation levels, I centered my attention 
on the external conditions that facilitate the internationalization of organizations. Prior 
work in this area mainly draws on contemporaneous conditions as explanatory factors for 
internationalization behavior (e.g. Luo & Tung, 2007; Ramamurti & Singh, 2008; 
Yamakawa, Peng & Deeds, 2008). But while contemporary factors certainly comprise a 
significant part of explaining firm internationalization, they are highly similar for firms 
5 
 
that originate from the same country. So while contemporaneous factors can explain 
differences across countries, they lack a differentiating effect for firms from the same 
country that could explain heterogeneity in internationalization behavior.  
But according to imprinting theory, differences in founding conditions can 
contribute to explaining heterogeneity in internationalization behavior irrespective of 
contemporary conditions. I therefore examined historical conditions that might exert a 
lasting impact on the internationalization behavior of firms in the future.  Since firms 
from EMEs tend to face large barriers to internationalization (Khavul et al., 2010), I 
focused on the main factors that hinder internationalization behavior. Based on findings 
from the OECD (OECD, 2008), there are four main barriers to internationalization: a lack 
of capabilities, limited resources, difficulty with identifying cross-border business 
opportunities, and unfamiliarity with foreign business practices. I therefore mapped these 
four dimensions to four variables that would not only affect these barriers, but also leave a 
lasting impact on organizations. 
 For a lack of capabilities, I looked at the availability of skilled labor in the market, 
as skilled employees allow organizations to develop the more complex capabilities that are 
needed for internationalization (Glaister, Lu, Sahadey & Gomes, 2014). Since the way jobs 
are executed within an organization is often highly dependent on the first person to hold a 
particular position, starting a firm with highly skilled employees is crucial for maintaining 
a high potential skill ceiling (Burton & Beckman, 2007).  
I operationalized limited resources as the levels of capital available in the market, 
i.e. how easily firms can gain access to new capital. Having capital available is necessary 
for organizations as the initial stages of internationalization tend to be capital-intensive and 
unprofitable. Having easy access to capital also incentives organizations to start using 
external capital from an early age, which has the side-effect of building relations and 
trustworthiness, thereby facilitating even more access to capital in the future (Uzzi, 1999). 
I looked at the demographic make-up of the country as a means to overcome 
unfamiliarity with foreign business practices, in particular how heterogeneous the 
population was. Being located in a heterogeneous environment increases the chance that 
organizations will employ a diverse workforce, which brings a wider set of perspectives 
and viewpoints to the organization (Johnson, Lenartowicz & Apud, 2006). A diverse 
population also forces organizations to develop capabilities adapt to a more varied demand 
from customers. The expertise that an organizations develops in this way can then be 
leveraged abroad.  
 Lastly I took the presence of foreign multinationals as an opportunity to identify 
business opportunities abroad, as through knowledge spillover effects incumbents could 
learn more about potential opportunities in the MNE home country. However, foreign 
MNEs generally enjoy superior resources and reputation, and are better positioned to 
attract the local resources needed for internationalization process than newly founded firms 
can (Hennart, 2012). While incumbent firms can benefit from foreign MNE knowledge 
spillovers as they might have developed their own local network to resist resource 
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appropriation, newly founded firms are not in a position to do so, and foreign MNE 
presence can actually limit their opportunity to internationalize. Moreover, foreign MNEs 
also frequently bring technological knowledge spillovers to EMs, and by using their 
superior knowledge of the local market, newly founded firms can actually be incentivized 
to remain domestic in order to exploit this advantage (Görg & Strobl, 2002).  
 My findings for this project, based on nearly 3000 firms from 21 emerging 
markets over 20 different founding years (1993-2012), show support for the suggested 
outcomes listed above. This demonstrates that founding conditions have a significant effect 
on predicting the future internationalization behavior of organizations. More specifically, I 
show that founding conditions interact with the barriers to internationalization that firms 
experience, which helps to explain the differences we see in emerging market 
internationalization behavior, both across and within countries.  
 
Second project - Founding munificence and future performance: the silver spoon 
My first project demonstrated how external founding conditions can have a 
lasting impact on the internationalization behavior of firms. For my second project I was 
interested in other means through which founding conditions could have an enduring effect 
on organizations. The motive behind this project was initially driven by phenomenological 
observations, as both discussions with entrepreneurs and anecdotal media evidence from 
larger firms pointed towards one particular founding condition that was indicative of their 
future success: experiencing hardship during their time of founding. 
 The basic premise deduced from these observations was that when organizations 
experience difficult starting conditions, it would serve as a good preparation for any 
hardships the organizations might face in the future (Swaminathan, 1996). This has two 
underlying causes. The first is that difficult times force organizations to develop effective 
capabilities simply to survive. When faced with an unforgiving environment, efficiency 
and optimization become key factors that are necessary for firm to survive. In the future, 
organizations can use these capabilities and exploit them to realize superior returns, 
especially when faced with renewed hardships. Conversely, firms that were found during 
more munificent times are more likely to be born with a so called silver spoon in their 
mouth. A more forgiving environment allows firms to be less efficient and optimized, 
thereby potentially developing capabilities that disadvantage them in the future (Brittain & 
Freeman, 1981). leaving them ill-prepared for weathering rougher times.  
 The second mechanism through which founding munificence affects future 
performance is that hazard rates are much higher during harsher times. This can partially 
be explained due to the type of firms that are founded during these times: low munificence 
generally correlates strongly with increased unemployment, and more newly unemployed 
people attempting to secure an income by starting a company. However, these people tend 
to become entrepreneurs out of necessity rather than identified business opportunities. 
Therefore, they are typically not the ideally situated to become successful entrepreneurs.  
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But more generally, surviving in harsher times is simply more difficult to achieve. 
This is especially true for newly founded firms, as they frequently have a limited buffer to 
overcome down periods, and their inherent liability of newness exposes them to more 
risks. As a consequence, there is a strong selection effect stemming from founding 
conditions (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Freeman, Carroll & Hannan, 1983). Harsh 
founding conditions weed out organizations that try to incorporate less efficient or 
optimized approaches, whereas munificent founding conditions allow a variety of 
strategies to proliferate, with different levels of success.  
To test the role of founding munificence on future firm performance, I looked at 
various founding conditions across the US. For this project I therefore took a more fine-
grained unit of analysis than in the first project, as I conducted my analysis at the industry 
level within a single country. Within this context, I found support for my hypothesized 
effects: while harsh founding conditions are indeed more hazardous and result in higher 
rates of organizational failure, firms that do manage to survive them tend to perform better 
in the long run than firms that were founded during more munificent times. This 
observation holds true even when controlling for the selection effect that survivor bias 
might have on the quality of these firms. These findings support the hypothesis that the 
external founding conditions of organizations have a lasting impact on future firm 
performance. This finding lends further credence to the notion that when analyzing firm 
performance, there should be more concerned with accounting for environmental effects, 
not only from a contemporary perspective but a historical one as well. 
 
Third project - The humanly devised external context  
My first and second project used imprinting theory to analyze the role of 
historical context. In order to create a richer understanding of the interplay between 
organizations and their surroundings I dissected this interaction from a contemporary 
perspective for my third project. I therefore draw on institutional theory in accounting for 
the role of the current organizational context.  
Using institutions to predict organizational outcomes is not a novel concept, and 
there is a plethora of studies in the literature that apply this approach. But institutions are 
incredibly varied and context-specific, which makes it difficult to iterate on prior findings 
and construct an overarching narrative. To tackle this issue I decided to conduct a meta-
analysis in order to empirically aggregate findings across a variety of different contexts. 
By using the results of prior studies as single data points I am able to achieve a much 
larger scope than otherwise would be possible.   
To limit the potential for confounding factors, I wanted to focus on the 
institutions that are the least opaque to organizations and the most homogenous within a 
context: the governing rules and laws in their environment. These formal institutions have 
the advantage of being codified, leading to fewer interpretations of their meaning, and 
generally provide little institutional complexity, as legitimate opposing institutions are 
rare. As a consequence, the effects of these institutions on organizations are likely to be 
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more consistent than those from informal institutions such as cultural norms, who can 
cause more ambiguity and are generally less homogenously present in a given context. 
One setting that is especially suited for this approach is that of mergers and 
acquisitions (M&As), an activity that globally consists of trillions of dollars on a yearly 
basis (Thomson Reuters, 2018). M&As clearly have an incredible impact on the economy 
through their sheer volume alone, yet the activity itself is still poorly understood, and prior 
attempts at studying this phenomenon on a meta-analytical level have led to inconclusive 
results. However, many studies do not account for the context in which deals were 
conducted, which could explain the variance in outcomes that individual studies are 
reporting. I therefore took prior studies as the basic data for this paper, and layered 
institutional data on top of that. 
Particularly interesting about this context is that M&As are generally conducted 
with the premise of increasing shareholder value, yet there is little systematic evidence that 
they actually achieve this goal (King et al, 2004). One explanation for these findings is that 
M&As can be conducted with ulterior motives: as a means of expropriating shareholder 
wealth by transferring value from one entity to another (Dyck & Zyngales, 2004; 
Holderness, 2003). Many countries have adopted various institutions with the intent to 
inhibit these practices, and protect the shareholders of organizations from being 
expropriated (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Schelifer & Vishny, 1999). These institutions 
operate through imposing a set of boundaries on what organizations can and cannot do 
when conducting an M&A, and therefore directly affect organizational behavior. Yet even 
though such measures are common, we know very little about the actual effects these 
institutions have on organizational outcomes, and if they indeed generate positive results 
for M&As. This is the gap I aim to address with my third project. To determine if these 
institutions actually perform as intended and improve shareholder value, I examined how 
both M&A prevalence and performance are affected by different levels of shareholder 
protection,. 
To study these institutions, I conducted a meta-analysis of over 93 papers 
harboring 385 effect sizes from that used 21 different countries as empirical settings. I 
enriched this data with the indices of anti-self-dealing laws and the anti-director rights, to 
my knowledge the most comprehensive measures available on shareholder protection 
levels across various countries. In my analysis, I found that stronger levels of shareholder 
protection reduce the number of M&As that are undertaken. This is not unexpected, as the 
more difficult it is to initiate and complete an M&A, the lower their occurrence is likely to 
be. However, the results also show that higher levels of shareholder protection actually 
reduce the profitability of M&As, and thereby lower shareholder value. By constricting 
managerial freedom in order to hamper M&As that occur for selfish reasons, these 
institutions appear to have the unintended side-effect of limiting the capability of 
organizations to pursue more profitable acquisitions, potentially because these acquisitions 
tend to be riskier.  
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Implications 
The research presented in this dissertation aims to advance our understanding of 
how organizations are affected by the external context they operate in. I do so by 
employing two complementary theoretical concepts across three studies. In the second and 
third chapters I make use of imprinting theory, and show some of the lasting consequences 
that organizations face as a result of the circumstances during their time of birth. In the 
fourth chapter I use institutional theory with a meta-analytical methodology to account for 
the contemporary conditions of the external context. Table 1.1 summarizes these three 
studies. Taken together, these studies jointly highlight the various means through which 
organizational decision making is contextually bound and guided. I will now elaborate on 
these studies more in depth in the subsequent chapters. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
EMERGING MARKET FIRM INTERNATIONALIZATION: AN 
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPRINTING PERSPECTIVE 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
Most theories of internationalization stress contemporaneous factors to explain why firms 
engage in cross-border activities. We argue instead that the seeds from which 
internationalization paths develop are frequently sown much earlier. Building on 
imprinting theory, we argue that critical environmental conditions in a company‘s 
founding year – availability of skilled labor, access to capital, the presence of foreign 
MNEs, and population diversity – can lower barriers to later internationalization. While 
these factors are fairly stable in most developed markets, they tend to change much more 
in the dynamic context of emerging markets, making the latter an excellent natural 
laboratory for testing the influence of non-contemporaneous institutional factors. Using a 
sample of 2,813 emerging market firms founded in the post-1993 period across 21 
different emerging markets, we find compelling support for the role of these environmental 
imprinting effects. 
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2.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Over the past decade, internationalization activities on a global level have seen a sharp 
decline. During the same time period, however, emerging markets (EMs) have actually 
increased their international participation. For example, currently nine of the 20 largest 
investor countries represent developing or transition economies (UNCTAD, 2015), and the 
emergence of global players such as Huawei from China, Infosys from India, and Grupo 
Bimbo from Mexico challenge the conventional views on the competitiveness of emerging 
market multinational corporations (EMNCs). This rise in EMNCs‘ internationalization 
levels is a surprising phenomenon, not only because it counters the globally declining trend 
of foreign direct investment (FDI), but also because firms from EMs tend to face higher 
barriers to internationalization compared to firms originating from developed economies 
(Khavul, Pérez-Nordtvedt & Wood, 2010). 
The decision to internationalize generally has a major impact on firms‘ resource 
commitments and subsequent performance, and researchers have intensively scrutinized 
the factors that influence the initiation of locating firm activities abroad (Anand & Delios, 
2002; Chan, Isobe & Makino, 2008; Lu & Beamish, 2001). Traditionally, researchers 
relied on the eclectic paradigm to explain the extent of firm internationalization (Dunning, 
2001), which argues that the level of firms‘ cross-border activities increases when there are 
opportunities to exploit ownership, locational, or internalization advantages. However, the 
degree of internationalization pursued by EMNCs does not seem to fit this paradigm 
(Bonaglia, Goldstein & Matthews, 2007; Tsai & Eisingerich, 2010). A variety of 
alternative explanations have therefore been put forward to explain the drivers that 
influence the degree of internationalization pursued by this new class of international 
actors. Most of these explanations emphasize the role of contemporaneous conditions, such 
as resource deprivation in the home country (Luo & Tung, 2007; Ramamurti & Singh, 
2008), state-driven expansionism (Horta, 2009; Luo, Xue & Han, 2010), increased 
involvement of foreign investors (Yamakawa, Peng & Deeds, 2008), and the exploitation 
of familiarity with institutional voids in other countries (Cuervo-Cazurra & Genc, 2008). 
While these perspectives partially explain the distinctive internationalization decisions of 
EMNCs, they favor contemporary factors and tend to overlook the impact of historical 
influences on firm internationalization, such as the conditions in firms‘ home countries at 
the time of founding (Jones & Khanna, 2006).  
Due to the common emphasis on contemporary explanations in the 
internationalization literature, our understanding of how historical antecedents may 
influence later-stage internationalization is still limited. However, prior research has 
revealed that the political systems that are present during the founding of an organization 
influence that organization‘s target country selection when internationalizing (Kriauciunas 
and Kale, 2006), and that the degree of firm internationalization at founding instills an 
imprint that affects firm survival and growth in the future (Sapienza, Autio, George & 
Zahra, 2006). These initial findings suggest that imprinting theory, which argues that 
15 
 
founding conditions can produce a lasting influence on the strategic decision making of 
organizations (Marquis & Tilcsik, 2013; Simsek, Fox & Healey, 2015; Stinchcombe, 
1965), could help explain firms‘ internationalization behavior. 
According to imprinting theory, the founding environment imprints firms by 
imbuing them with ―sticky‖ capabilities (Szulanski, 1996), stable firm routines (Nelson & 
Winter, 1982) and rigid cognitive frames (Levinthal & March, 1993), which can persist 
even in the presence of negative feedback (Kilduff, 1992; Levinthal, 2003). Yet, while we 
know that founding conditions can affect foreign target selection (Kriauciunas & Kale, 
2006) and post-internationalization survival and performance rates (Sapienza et al., 2006), 
we know little about how founding conditions influence firm internationalization itself. We 
address this gap by building on imprinting theory (Boeker, 1989; Le Mens, Hannan & 
Polós, 2011; Marquis & Huang, 2010; Simsek et al., 2015; Stinchcombe, 1965) to explain 
how country-level factors present at the time of firm founding influence the extent to 
which EMNCs will pursue internationalization in the future. 
By applying imprinting theory to the internationalization decision, we provide a 
complementary explanation to accounts that stress contemporaneous factors. An 
explanation rooted in the imprinting perspective is particularly salient in the EM context, 
where environmental conditions are in flux, and firms frequently face a wide discrepancy 
between founding conditions and contemporaneous environments. A key factor in EM 
environmental change is the active involvement of the state in shaping the broader context 
that EMNCs face. For example, states can establish business schools, intervene to secure 
access to capital, or provide special access to foreign MNEs, thereby creating an 
environment that facilitates future firm internationalization (Knill & Lehmkulh, 2002; 
Milner, 1996; Spencer, Murtha & Lenway, 2005). We address this by developing an 
imprinting theory of EMNC internationalization, which proposes that states affect 
founding conditions – availability of skilled labor, access to capital, foreign business 
opportunities, and familiarity with foreign business practices – which affect perceived 
barriers to internationalization (OECD, 2008).  
To test these imprinting effects, we created a unique database capturing the degree 
of internationalization of 2,813 publicly-listed EMNCs, founded across 21 EMs, in the 
dynamic period between 1993 and 2012. This period provides a particularly useful 
research context in which to test imprinting theory, as EMs have undergone rapid socio-
economic and policy changes over these two decades, which resulted in a wide variety of 
founding conditions across countries and years (Luo et al., 2010; Ramamurti, 2008; 
Sauvant, 2005). The time frame we focus on has been marked by several major events that 
have had a particularly great impact in EMs, such as the collapse of the Soviet Union, the 
Asian financial crisis, the Mexican peso crisis (1994), and the great Argentinian depression 
(1998). Moreover, the post-1993 time frame also marks the period in which EMNCs first 
entered the global marketplace and in which rapid surges in their internationalization were 
recorded (Hoskisson, Wright, Filatotchev & Peng, 2013).  
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We intend to make three contributions with this study. First, we introduce 
imprinting theory as a complementary perspective to extant theories of firm 
internationalization. Specifically, we use imprinting theory to provide insight into the non-
contemporaneous sources of variance in the degree of internationalization that occurs 
across EMNCs (Gammeltoft, Barnard & Madhok, 2010; Hoskisson et al., 2013). Second, 
we add to the EM literature by deepening our understanding of the uniqueness of the 
continuously changing and evolving EM context, and its effects on firm strategies (e.g. 
Hitt, Ahlstrom, Dacin, Levitas & Svobodina, 2004). Due to the volatility and dynamic 
nature of EM settings, founding conditions are more diverse, and imprinting effects are 
likely to be more pronounced than in developed markets. Third, we contribute to the 
imprinting literature by exploring whether deliberate state interventions in countries‘ 
institutional environments affect later-stage firm behavior. Whereas environmental 
imprinting effects are usually believed to result from accidental or coincidental 
circumstances, we show that state intervention can construct imprinting environments that 
are conducive to promoting future internationalization (Knill & Lehmkulh, 2002; Milner, 
1996).  We thus suggest the possibility of agency to purposefully create a context that 
bestows EMNCs with the characteristics they need to foster subsequent 
internationalization. 
 
2.2 THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
 
Imprinting in EMNCs 
Since the 1980s, EMs have increased their presence in the global economy through 
increased EMNC internationalization behavior (UNCTAD, 2015). However, EMNC 
internationalization behaviors appear to go against the grain of conventional 
internationalization theories. Diverging from the internationalization patterns observed in 
developed markets, EMNCs show a tendency to internationalize early, and to disregard 
incremental foreign growth steps (Bonaglia, Goldstein & Matthews, 2007; Tsai & 
Eisingerich, 2010). Furthermore, given the relatively high barriers to internationalization 
that EMNCs face, such as limited access to capital, lack of skilled employees, and 
unfamiliarity with foreign markets (e.g. Alfaro, Kalemi-Ozcan & Volosovych, 2008; 
Burgess & Steenkamp, 2006; De Santis, 1997), the predicted internationalization of 
EMNCs would be minimal. Yet, their international investments appear to be growing, even 
while those from developed market MNCs are declining (FDiIntelligence, 2015).  
To explain these differences in internationalization behavior, the literature often 
characterizes EMNCs in terms of how their attributes differ from those of mature market 
multinationals. For example, EMNCs are claimed to be more resource-constrained (Luo & 
Tung, 2007), more diversified (Aybar & Ficici, 2009), more likely to bundle foreign 
intangible assets with local complementary assets (Hennart, 2012), and more strongly 
backed by national governments than their Western counterparts (Luo et al, 2010). 
However, EMNCs are not a homogeneous group of economic actors (Ramamurti, 2009), 
17 
 
and they differ markedly from each other in terms of the strategic characteristics they 
exhibit, most notably in terms of their degree of internationalization. Previous research has 
suggested that this is largely due to country of origin effects (e.g. Bonaglia et al, 2007; 
Duysters, Jacob, Lemmens, & Jintian, 2009; Ramamurti, 2008), although the specific 
mechanism by which country of origin influences the extent of internationalization 
remains relatively unexplored.  
One area where the influence of this country of origin effect is especially salient is 
the high degree of state intervention commonly present in this context (Fan, Wei & Xue, 
2011). National governments in EMs generally have a large influence on the 
environmental context in which firms operate (Knill & Lehmkulh, 2002; Milner & 
Keohane, 1996), particularly with regard to EMNC internationalization (Wang, Hong, 
Kafouros & Wright, 2012). Many EM contexts are characterized by state-driven 
international expansion efforts, with governments providing either direct or indirect 
support for firms to venture abroad, in the pursuit of knowledge or resources (Horta, 2009; 
Luo et al, 2010).  
But governments can also stimulate the internationalization behavior of firms 
through more indirect means. When firms are newly founded, they have a limited number 
of viable strategic options available to them due to their liability of newness (Freeman, 
Carroll & Hannan, 1983). As a consequence, the strategic choices that are developed are 
heavily influenced by the degree of fit with the environment at the time of founding, as 
nascent firms have to deal with contextual uncertainty and must establish legitimacy for 
themselves (Hannan & Freeman, 1977; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). The founding 
environment thus plays an important role in determining the initial firm strategy and in 
setting the stage for the necessary development of capabilities (Boeker, 1989). By 
modifying the conditions that firms are exposed to at their time of founding, governments 
can therefore also influence internationalization behavior in a more indirect manner.  
The initial strategies with regard to internationalization can play a particularly 
large part in determining the future of the firm (Knight & Cavusgil, 2004), as these 
strategies require substantive commitments from the firm towards the development of 
capabilities and resources that are difficult and costly to reverse. For example, these 
decisions may include the acquisition of specialized physical assets, the establishment of 
administrative structures, and the design of appropriate organizational systems (Levinthal, 
2003). The implementation of such strategies therefore creates a partial lock-in for 
organizations, as these decisions tend to result in the development of enduring routines, 
capabilities, and cognitive frames that support their initial strategic direction. 
Founding conditions that (dis)incentivize internationalization behavior are 
particularly salient in EMs, as EMs tend to have large barriers to internationalization 
(Khavul et al., 2010). Barriers to internationalization are not unique to the EM context 
(Buckley, 1993): conducting business abroad requires an understanding of foreign business 
practices that are different from those in the home country; a lack of direct access to 
foreign markets makes it difficult for firms to identify suitable market opportunities 
(Leonidou, 2004); and adequate learning about foreign markets requires time and resource 
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investments with uncertain payoffs (Sapienza et al., 2006). But compared to developed 
nations, most of these internationalization barriers are especially salient in the EM context 
(Khavul et al., 2010): EMs tend to be less enveloped in the global economy, have less 
mature financial markets (De Santis, 1997), less educated populations (Burgess & 
Steenkamp, 2006), worse infrastructures (Arnold & Quelch, 1998), and lower institutional 
quality in general (Alfaro et al., 2008). As a result, when compared to firms from 
developed markets, EMNCs experience more obstacles to secure key components required 
for internationalization, such as attracting qualified labor, collecting sufficient financial 
capital, and gathering knowledge on foreign business opportunities. 
However, the EM context is not homogenous (Ramamurti, 2009), and some firms 
are better equipped to overcome these barriers than others. This is partially due to 
imprinting effects, as firms tend to incorporate the prevailing social and political 
arrangements into their organizational design during founding (Carroll & Hannan, 2004). 
Interactions with the conditions present at founding initiate the development of 
organizational practices and capabilities appropriate for that environment (Marquis & 
Tilcsik, 2013). Due to inertial pressures and forces of institutionalization, these initial 
conditions subsequently endow firms with practices and capabilities that they retain long 
after founding (Carroll & Hannan, 2004; Marquis & Tilcsik, 2013). For example, 
Kriauciunas & Kale (2006) found that firms from Eastern Europe predating the fall of 
communism are endowed with a socialist imprint that hinders their capability to build 
knowledge routines and curbs their competitive aspirations, while research by Marquis & 
Qian (2013) showed that older Chinese firms are deeply imprinted by their founding 
bureaucratic conditions and unlikely to adopt new governance practices. But imprinting 
forces can provide firms with long-term benefits as well, through the initiation of 
capability development. For example, Sullivan, Tang & Marquis (2013) demonstrated that 
venture capital firms were imprinted with learning capabilities that resulted in competitive 
advantages, and Sapienza et al. (2006) showed that the decision of firms to internationalize 
early in their lifespan endows them with a capability to adapt to uncertain environments.  
By endowing firms with durable capabilities or liabilities that affect their ability 
to engage with barriers to internationalization, imprinting forces can influence the degree 
of internationalization pursued by firms. We argue that through these imprinting effects, 
the conditions that a firm is exposed to at its time of founding can initiate the development 
of capabilities (or liabilities) that can help (or hinder) it to overcome these barriers in the 
long run. Consequently, we expect that firms endowed with enabling capabilities will be 
more likely to pursue higher degrees of internationalization during their lifetime, while 
firms suffering from imprinted liabilities will be less inclined to internationalize, regardless 
of how favorable the contemporaneous environment might be to internationalization. 
In our treatment of internationalization barriers, we adopt the classification 
suggested by the OECD, which assigns these barriers to four distinct categories based on 
an extensive examination of previously written monographs and of globalization patterns 
of firms (Estime & Peric, 1997). These categories consist of (1) capability barriers, (2) 
finance barriers, (3) access barriers, and (4) business environment barriers. According to 
this classification, capability barriers refer to the skills required to execute and incorporate 
business planning, marketing, and knowledge of procedures. Finance barriers relate to 
access to capital, international insurance, and export tariffs. Access barriers entail access to 
general market information, specific market analyses, and identification of business 
opportunities. Finally, business environment barriers consider the external environment of 
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the firm, such as a lack of trade agreements, unfavorable regulations, lack of governmental 
assistance, and unfamiliarity with foreign business environments (OECD, 2008). 
 
Capability Barriers 
One of the largest barriers to internationalization, especially in the EM context, is the small 
pool of highly educated employees available (OECD, 2008). Successful 
internationalization requires complementary resources and capabilities, with skilled 
employees perhaps being the most important of these factors (Glaister, Liu, Sahadev & 
Gomes, 2014). This issue is especially salient in EMs, where skilled workers are scarce 
and the graduation rate of newly trained specialists frequently trails the growth rate of the 
economy (Nakata & Sivakumar, 1997).  
While skilled labor may function as a catalyst for internationalization at any time, 
the supply of qualified labor at the time of founding may have a more lasting effect on 
firms‘ strategic behavior. Employees who are the first to hold a particular position at the 
time of founding tend to imprint the firm by defining the way in which future employees 
fulfill that particular position (Burton & Beckman, 2007). A similar process occurs at the 
collective level, as original employees and their needs define the human resource 
management (HRM) practices of the firm (Gooderham, Nordhaug & Ringdal, 1998). The 
labor roles and administrative arrangements in a firm will therefore continue to reflect the 
environmental conditions that prevailed at the time of founding (e.g., Baron & Newman, 
1990). The availability of skilled labor to an organization in its founding environment can 
therefore have a lasting effect in dictating the development trajectory that influences the 
culture and HRM practices of the firm later on (Bjorkman & Lu, 2001).  
Once firms have implemented a set of job roles and HRM practices that reflect the 
skills of their employees at founding, forces of inertia and institutionalization ensure that 
these practices persist in firms (Carroll & Hannan, 2004; Marquis & Tilcsik, 2013). When 
firms possess an HRM system capable of accounting for highly demanding jobs, it can be 
adapted for the implementation of similarly demanding jobs, such as those with the 
skillsets required for internationalization. Inversely, firms that have an HRM system in 
place that was originally developed to harness and exploit unskilled labor will find it more 
difficult to accommodate the highly skilled workers needed to manage complex 
internationalization processes during later stages of organizational evolution. The imprint 
that emerges in firm's‘ initial job roles and HRM system from the labor conditions at 
founding therefore provides firms with specific capabilities, which are either conducive or 
detrimental to attracting the type of employees needed to foster internationalization 
strategies. Thus, we hypothesize:  
 
Hypothesis 1: Available skilled labor at the time of EMNC founding is positively 
related to the degree of internationalization by the firm at later stages. 
 
Finance Barrier 
OECD identifies lack of access to required capital for internationalization as the 
major financial barrier that inhibits firms‘ international expansion (OECD, 2008). Firms 
that attempt to internationalize often need initial access to long-term capital to finance their 
expansion, since internationalization tends to require a few years to turn profitable 
(Sapienza et al., 2006). Furthermore, internationalization is also inherently risky, and many 
firms that try to internationalize experience lower profits or fail abroad (George, Wiklund 
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& Zahra, 2005). Firms that possess access to external financiers are therefore in a better 
position to engage in risky strategic options like internationalization, compared to firms 
that are forced to mostly rely on self-financing (George, 2005). 
If firms have access to functioning external capital markets during their time of 
founding, they are more likely to employ external capital, initiate financial network 
linkages, and develop investor relations capabilities at an early age (Aldrich & Auster, 
1986; Singh, Tucker & House, 1986; Stinchcombe, 1965). But developing networks of 
trust-based relationships with financiers takes time (Krackhardt, Nohria & Eccles, 2003). 
As a consequence, past connections to, and cumulated relational experiences with 
financiers become a network memory that continues to have bearing on firms (Soda, Usai 
& Zaheer, 2004). Prior research has shown that these historical ties from an organization‘s 
past continue to affect current outcomes (McEvily, Jaffee & Tortoriello, 2012). The ties 
created with financiers during founding are especially important, as firms are particularly 
susceptible to external influences during this time. The initial conditions in which these 
financial network ties are established therefore imprint their structure in such a way that it 
remains relatively invariant over time (Marquis, 2003; Stinchcombe, 1965).  
The network ties that a firm builds over time form a part of their social 
embeddedness, which influences their access to and cost of capital (Uzzi, 1999). Firms that 
are socially embedded in financial networks are more likely to develop capabilities that 
facilitate a search for capital. Moreover, higher levels of social embeddedness reduce the 
costs and risk associated with financial investments, making financiers more willing to 
provide capital and at a lower cost (Uzzi, 1999). As a result, easier access to capital 
facilitates the costly initiation of internationalization strategies (George, 2005). Inversely, 
when firms are founded in an environment that lacks functional external capital markets, 
they are less likely to develop the dedicated capabilities and relationships that are required 
to attract capital for internationalization during later stages of the organizational life cycle. 
We therefore hypothesize: 
 
Hypothesis 2: Available capital at the time of EMNC founding is positively 
related to the degree of internationalization by the firm at later stages. 
 
 
Access Barrier 
In the category of access barriers, the difficulty of identifying business 
opportunities abroad is generally considered to be the most salient barrier organizations 
face (OECD, 2008). When firms have limited exposure to foreign business opportunities, it 
is difficult to correctly identify and evaluate such opportunities (Leonidou, 2004). 
Knowledge of foreign business opportunities is especially limited in EMs, as they are 
historically less integrated in global markets. But this lack of knowledge can be partially 
offset by the presence of foreign MNEs. Through knowledge spillovers into the general 
market, foreign MNEs can provide information about their home countries and other 
international operations (Fosfuri, Motta & Rønde, 2001). As a result, an increased presence 
of foreign MNEs can facilitate access to foreign business opportunities for domestic firms 
(Blomström, Kokko & Globerman, 2001). 
However, while the contemporary effects of foreign MNE presence benefitting 
internationalization have been well documented (Fosfuri, Motta & Rønde, 2001; Haacker, 
1999; Mirza, 2004), their presence may have the opposite effect on newly founded firms. 
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Foreign MNEs are often seen as attractive employers by skilled local workers and can rely 
on strong reputations to appropriate human resources (Teece, 1986). But these skilled 
workers are an important resource for internationalization (Glaiser, Liu, Sahadev & 
Gomes, 2014), and in EMs in particular, these skilled workers are scarce (Nakata & 
Sivakumar, 1997). Due to their reputation, Foreign MNEs can preempt local firms and 
prevent them from accessing and acquiring these scarce resources. Existing domestic firms 
might use their superior knowledge of the local market to acquire skilled labor with greater 
efficiency than foreign MNEs (Hennart, 2012). But newly founded firms suffer from a 
liability of newness, as they lack reputation, social capital and tangible resources (Autio, 
Sapienza & Almeida, 2000; Hannan & Freeman, 1977; Stinchcombe, 1965), and are thus 
limited in their ability to appropriate skilled labor when foreign MNEs are present.  
Moreover, foreign MNEs also provide strong incentives for newly founded firms 
to adopt a domestic orientation (Görg & Strobl, 2002). Some local firms will be 
incentivized to provide local complementary assets, which foreign MNEs can combine 
with their own intangible assets to quickly establish favorable market positions (Hennart, 
2012). But foreign MNEs also often create technical or operational knowledge spillovers 
(Blomström et al., 2001), which provide other opportunities for domestic firms (Chuang & 
Lin, 1999). Domestic firms are likely to possess superior market knowledge of their home 
country, which they can use as a competitive advantage vis-à-vis these foreign 
multinationals, while benefiting from their knowledge spillovers in other areas. The co-
location of foreign MNEs and domestic firms might thus create an ecosystem focused on 
exploiting local advantages. 
We therefore expect that EM firms founded in an environment in which foreign 
MNEs are present will develop a set of coping routines and organizational capabilities that 
hinder their later-stage internationalization. This is both due to preemption on local factor 
markets by foreign MNEs, and, more subtly, to the creation of an ecosystem geared 
towards exploiting local advantages. Foreign MNE presence thus instills a domestic 
orientation in newly founded EM firms that is difficult and costly to reverse in later time 
periods (Knight & Kim, 2009). This leads us to the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 3: Inward FDI at the time of EMNC founding is negatively related to 
the degree of internationalization by the firm at later stages. 
 
Business Environment Barrier 
The most important barrier identified by the OECD with regards to the business 
environment is unfamiliarity with foreign business practices (OECD, 2008). Due to 
cultural differences across countries, firms may face unfamiliar business practices when 
they venture abroad, such as differences in negotiation styles (Leonidou, 2004; Tesfom, 
Lutz & Ghauri, 2006). A lack of prior exposure to different business environments can 
generate significant problems for firms when encountered abroad (Tesfom et al., 2006). 
The lack of knowledge of foreign business practices can be offset by firms when 
they employ a diverse labor force in terms of cultural backgrounds (Johnson, Lenartowicz 
& Apud, 2006). Prior research has emphasized that employee heterogeneity can have a 
positive effect on the degree of firm internationalization: heterogeneity increases the 
likelihood that a firm will consider a variety of perspectives (Richard, 2000), it means firm 
members will have a greater knowledge of foreign languages (Zucchella, Palamra & 
Denicolai, 2007), and it provides a more heterogeneous working environment, leading to 
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greater acceptance and understanding of cultural differences (Murtha & Lenway, 1994). 
Employee heterogeneity also aids internationalization in various other ways: it promotes 
learning and innovation (Hitt, Hoskisson & Kim, 1997), increases the firm‘s breadth and 
depth of knowledge (Zahra, Ireland & Hitt, 2000), and can enhance the speed of learning 
from new experiences (Ghoshal, 1987). Having a more diverse set of employees thus 
provides firms with the capability to better anticipate, and adapt to, differences in business 
practices the firm might encounter internationally. 
As with skilled labor, firms with access to a heterogeneous set of employees are 
more likely to design an organizational system with HRM practices that can turn this 
heterogeneity into a competitive advantage (Wright, Dunford & Snell, 2001; Wright, 
McMahan & McWilliams, 1994). While heterogeneity may bring some advantages in the 
home market, other firms founded in the same environment are likely to be endowed with 
similar capabilities. In the international market, however, a heterogeneous workforce with 
accompanying HRM practices can translate into a competitive advantage over firms with 
employees from more homogeneous backgrounds. Firms with more heterogeneous 
employees are thus incentivized to internationalize. The inertia of the initial employee 
makeup can therefore turn into a capability for internationalization (Farrell & Saloner, 
1985; Utterback & Abernath, 1975). Since it is the accommodative imprinted 
organizational culture that provides the capability to internationalize (Smircich, 1983), 
firms that were founded in environments typified by high population heterogeneity are 
likely to maintain this ability, even if the home country subsequently becomes more 
homogeneous. Thus, we hypothesize: 
 
Hypothesis 4: Population heterogeneity at the time of EMNC founding is 
positively related to the degree of internationalization by the firm at later stages. 
 
 
 
2.3 METHODOLOGY 
 
Sample and data collection 
We tested our hypotheses on a population of the largest publicly listed EMNCs 
founded in the period between 1993 and 2012. This period encompasses the increasing 
participation of EMs in the international economy (Autio et al, 2000; Zahra, 2005), and 
their increased economic power has led to previously unseen EMNC founding and 
internationalization rates (Hoskisson et al., 2013; UNCTAD, 2009). Furthermore, the EM 
context lends itself particularly well for studying the role of imprinting effects, because 
economic and institutional factors in EMs (e.g. customer demand, exchange rate 
fluctuations, degree of governmental interference or levels of violence) exhibit much more 
variation over time when compared to developed markets (Meyer, Estrin, Bhaumik & 
Peng, 2008). Unique characteristics such as governmental intervention in support of 
EMNCs‘ internationalization (Sauvant, 2005), the pursuit of home market legitimacy 
gained from internationalizing towards ‗credible‘ locations (Yamakawa, Peng & Deeds, 
2008), and rapid shifts in market-oriented policies (Perotti & van Oijen, 2001) further 
contribute to creating a set of heterogeneous conditions. Moreover, nearly all EMs 
experienced significant economic and institutional changes over time. As a result, firms 
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founded across different EMs and years have been subjected to relatively different 
imprinting forces, allowing for significant differences in their subsequent predisposition 
toward internationalization. Moreover, since so much variation exists across time, 
historical founding conditions are likely to differ markedly from contemporaneous 
conditions. This context thus provides us with a more advantageous vantage point from 
which to observe the factors that contribute to imprinting compared to the more stable 
context of developed countries. 
Classifications of which countries are or are not EMs vary. We therefore 
identified ten major lists of EMs and included all the countries that appeared on at least 
five of these lists.
1
 This resulted in the selection of 22 countries that are commonly 
identified as EMs: Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, the Czech Republic, Egypt, Hungary, 
India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, Pakistan, Peru, the Philippines, Poland, 
Russia, South Africa, South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand and Turkey. Due to a lack of 
available country-level data on Taiwan as a result of the disputed nature of its status as a 
sovereign state, we dropped this country from our analysis, leaving us with a final list of 
21 EM countries. 
We constructed our firm sample from the Orbis database
2
. In our selection of 
firms, we applied the following criteria: (i) the firm was founded between 1993 and 2012, 
given that for this period longitudinal data on institutional variance is available. Exploring 
the time period prior to 1993 was not feasible due to data unavailability; (ii) the firm was 
founded in one of the 21 identified EM countries. By casting our net this wide, we tried to 
maximize cross-sectional variance and ensure that we captured all kinds of EMNCs 
(Ramamurti, 2012); (iii) the firm was publicly-listed and had a market capitalization at the 
end of 2013 of at least 100 million US dollars to ensure adequate information disclosure 
and public verification.  
By applying these selection criteria, we created a list of 2,813 firms across 21 
countries for our analysis. The sample includes a majority of Asian firms, as 89% of our 
firms stem from this region, predominantly from China, South Korea, Malaysia and India. 
The firms in our sample have an average age of 14 years, and an average market 
capitalization of 1.42 billion USD. 
 
Dependent variable 
We measured our dependent variable, the degree of firm internationalization, by 
taking the number of foreign subsidiaries over total subsidiaries for the year 2013 (e.g., 
Harzing, 2000; Sullivan, 1994; Wang & Suh, 2009). We collected this data by collecting 
information on all the subsidiaries owned by the firms in our sample from Orbis, and 
coding their location. We then calculated the total number of foreign subsidiaries 
(compared to the headquarter location) and divided this by the total number of subsidiaries 
of the firm. As a result, our sample also contains firms with zero international subsidiaries. 
We chose to apply such a wide sample as it increases the generalizability of our findings 
and prevents sampling on the dependent variable. The degree of internationalization in our 
sample ranged from 0 to 100, with the average being 6. Our firms recorded 34,627 
                                                 
1
 IMF, Columbia University EMGP, BBVA, EAGLEs, Dow Jones, The Economist, BRIC 
+ Next 11, FTSE, MSCI, CIVETS and S&P 
2
 orbis.bvsinfo.com 
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subsidiaries in total, of which 4,085 were foreign. For the firms that had at least one 
foreign subsidiary (25.70%), the average degree of internationalization was 23. 
 Compared to other measures of internationalization, such as foreign sales over 
total sales (FSTS) or foreign assets over total assets (FATA), data on foreign subsidiaries 
is more widely available and captures the degree of international involvement of a firm 
particularly well (Stopford & Wells, 1973; Vernon, 1971). Subsample analyses of those 
firms for which we were able to collect other measures of internationalization indicated 
that the number of foreign subsidiaries over total subsidiaries was positively related but 
substantially different to FSTS (r=0.26; N=1248) and FATA (r=0.16, N=104).  
 
Independent variables 
We tested our hypotheses by examining how imprinting affects the most often 
reported indicator for each of the four internationalization barrier categories (OECD, 
2008). According to the OECD report, these barriers include: inadequate quality and/or 
untrained personnel as a capability barrier, a shortage of working capital as a finance 
barrier, limited information to locate/analyze markets as an access barrier, and 
unfamiliarity with foreign business practices as a business environment barrier. 
Skilled labor. We used the level of education in the population as a measure of 
the availability of skilled labor. This measure was constructed by adopting the Barro-Lee 
indicator for percentage of the population aged 15+ with completed tertiary education from 
the EdStats database. Since this data is only available with five-year increments, we used a 
multiple imputation approach to estimate the underlying missing values. This methodology 
is based on creating m values for each missing data point. This provides us with m full data 
sets, which we all then analyze and subsequently recombine the results. We chose this 
approach since other common methods for dealing with missing values such as listwise 
deletion, single imputation and mean imputation are often biased or inefficient (Fichman & 
Cummings, 2003). We used the Amelia II package in R to calculate our estimations.  
Market capitalization. Since our sample consists of publicly listed firms, we 
chose to estimate the availability of capital by measuring stock market capitalization. This 
is the major source of capital for publicly listed companies and is in line with prior studies 
that estimated access to capital (Di Giovanni, 2005; La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Schleifer 
& Vishny, 1997; Levine; 1996). For this measure, we divided the total market 
capitalization of listed companies by the GDP of a given country to indicate the size of the 
stock market, and therefore capital availability, relative to the size of the economy. This 
data was collected from the World Development Indicators. 
Presence of foreign MNEs. We employed the widely used inward foreign direct 
investment (FDI) as an indicator for the presence of foreign MNEs (e.g. Kwok & Tadesse, 
2006; Li & Liu, 2005). We collected this data from the UNCTADstat data center.  
Population heterogeneity. Since information on population heterogeneity 
remains scarce for EM countries, we constructed our own measure of heterogeneity. We 
did so by identifying three dimensions of population heterogeneity: ethnic, linguistic and 
religious (Alesina, Devleeschauwer, Easterly, Kurlat & Wacziarg, 2003; Faeron, 2003). 
Prior work has developed several population heterogeneity measures (Alesina et al., 2003; 
Fearon, 2003), but the measures constructed thus far are time-invariant and thus unsuitable 
for capturing imprinting effects. To construe our population heterogeneity variable, we 
turned to the Encyclopedia Britannica book of the year. This periodical annually provides 
information on the demographic make-up of all countries, based on surveys conducted in 
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these countries. The Encyclopedia provides data on ethnic, religious and linguistic make-
up. We used a Herfindahl index to convert the percentages from the Encyclopedia into a 
measure of heterogeneity. Since these surveys are not conducted on a yearly basis, some 
missing values exist. Similar to the skilled labor operationalization, we used the Amelia 
package in R to estimate these missing observations. After creating a complete set of 
observations for all three dimensions, we averaged the three scores to construct a single 
indicator for population heterogeneity. 
 
Control variables 
Our main control variables consist of the respective score for 2013 of each 
independent variable. These controls allow us to disentangle founding effects from 
contemporaneous effects, ensuring the validity of our independent variable scores as 
measures of imprinting effects. At the firm level, we included a control for firm age, 
measured as the difference in years between 2013 and the year of incorporation. Previous 
authors have suggested that firm age-related factors can influence the degree of 
internationalization, both positively and negatively (e.g. Autio et al., 2000; Oviatt & 
McDougall, 1997; 2005). We control for firm size by measuring market capitalization in 
2013 US dollars in the year in which we measured our dependent variable, namely 2013. 
This is in line with prior studies that have measured firm internationalization, as firm size 
can influence the availability of resources for expanding abroad (Carrier, 1994; Smith, 
Gannon, Grimm & Mitchell, 1998). We control for firm performance by measuring the 
firms‘ return on assets in the year we measured our dependent variable, i.e. 2013. Prior 
work has shown that firms with superior performance are more likely to internationalize 
(Lu & Beamish, 2004). Finally, since industry can play a role in the international 
orientation of firms (Boter & Holmquist, 1996), we coded dummy variables for four 
distinct types of industries: manufacturing, non-financial services, financial services and 
primary sector (reference category). We collected the data for all firm-level control 
variables from Orbis. 
 
Estimation method 
Similar to prior empirical work on imprinting (Carr, Haggard, Hmieleski & 
Zahra, 2010; Kriauciunas & Kale, 2006; Shinkle & Kriauciunas, 2012), we use regression 
analysis to estimate the effect of country-level imprinting. Specifically, we employ a two-
limit Tobit model on our set of 2,813 firms founded between 1993 and 2012. The 
dependent variable we employ in our sample is a continuous measure truncated by the 
lower and upper limits of 0 and 100 respectively, with a large number of 0 observations. 
Estimating ordinary least squares on data with many zero variables in the dependent 
variable, as is the case in our sample, can result in biased and inconsistent estimates for the 
parameters (Greene, 2002). We therefore applied a two-sided Tobit model (Greene, 2002; 
McDonald & Moffitt, 1980) for our analysis, as this methodology accounts for the 
likelihood that the dependent variable exceeds the threshold values. The Tobit 
methodology yields consistent and asymptotically efficient estimators by using a 
maximum-likelihood estimator (Long & Freese, 2006). All analyses were conducted using 
Rstudio version 0.98.1083. We tested our variables for skewness using the Shapiro-Wilk 
test prior to our analyses (Greene, 2002), which did not yield statistically significant 
deviations from normality. 
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corresponds to an increase in 5.4 percentage points of future internationalization, which is 
a moderate increase in the degree of internationalization of the firm.   
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2.4 RESULTS 
 
Table 2.1 provides the means, standard deviations, and correlations among the 
variables we employed in our analysis. The table shows large correlation coefficients 
between the abundance of skilled labor at founding and in 2013, as well as between the 
degrees of heterogeneity at founding and in 2013. Given that these variables are likely to 
be the most stable over time, this finding is not surprising. We did analyze the variance 
inflation factors (VIFs) of the model to ensure that multicollinearity was not a problem, 
and all scores were significantly lower than the critical value of 10 (Kutner, 1996). Table 
2.2 presents our regression results used to evaluate Hypotheses 1 through 4. In the first 
model of Table 2.2 we only include the control variables, models 2 through 5 test the direct 
effects of Hypotheses 1-4 respectively, while model 6 is the complete model with all 
hypotheses tested simultaneously. 
Model 6, Table 2.2, shows the results for our hypotheses. For Hypothesis 1, we 
find an estimated effect size of founding education levels on later firm internationalization 
that ranges between 0.3566 and 1.8833 (β = 1.1200, p=0.004, s.e. = 0.3893). This finding 
is congruent with our first hypothesis and suggests that the higher the availability of skilled 
workers during the founding of the firm, the greater the degree of firm internationalization 
in the future. When we interpret the magnitude of this effect, we find that an increase in 
one standard deviation (s.d.) from the mean of founding education levels (σ = 4.80). 
In our test of Hypothesis 2, we find that the estimated effect size of founding 
capital availability on future firm internationalization ranges between 0.0096 and 0.1476 (β 
= .0786, p = 0.0256, s.e. = 0.0352). This finding implies support for our second hypothesis, 
which would indicate that the higher the level of available capital at the time of firm 
founding, the higher the subsequent degree of internationalization by the firm. With regard 
to the magnitude of this effect, an increase in one s.d. from the mean of founding capital 
availability (σ = 43.51) coincides with an increase of 3.39 percentage points in subsequent 
internationalization, which is again a moderate increase in a firm‘s degree of 
internationalization.  
For our third Hypothesis, we predicted that the presence of foreign MNEs during 
firm founding would be a negative indicator for the eventual degree of internationalization. 
We found a corresponding estimated effect size ranging from -1.2042 to -4.3172 (β = -
2.7607, p = 0.0005, s.e. = 0.7938). This finding concurs with our third Hypothesis, which 
implies that the higher the level of foreign MNE presence during firm founding, the lower 
the firm‘s eventual degree of internationalization will be. Once again, we find a moderate 
effect when interpreting its size, as an increase of one s.d. from the mean of founding 
foreign MNE presence (σ = 1.57) is consistent with a decrease of 4.33 percentage points in 
later firm internationalization. 
Finally, our fourth Hypothesis predicts that the higher the degree of population 
heterogeneity during firm founding, the higher the eventual degree of the firm‘s 
internationalization will be. For this hypothesis we found an effect size ranging from 7.135 
to 84.145 (β = 45.634, p = 0.0201, s.e. = 19.637). This finding is again consistent with our 
fourth Hypothesis, indicating that the heterogeneity of a firm‘s founding environment has a 
positive impact on the future internationalization of the firm. We also find a moderate 
effect size for our final hypothesis, as an increase of one s.d. from the mean of founding 
heterogeneity (σ = 0.11) corresponds to an increase of 5.02 percentage points in the future 
degree of firm internationalization.   
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All hypotheses also show similar results in the direct models where we test for the 
effects of a single hypothesis in isolation (models 2-5) when compared to the total model 
(model 6). Overall, our findings indicate strong support for the presence of imprinting 
effects and their influence on firm internationalization. 
 
Robustness tests 
Since internationalization is a risky endeavor, our sample suffers from a potential 
survivor bias. In order to control for the effects of self-selection and to produce consistent 
estimates we conducted a robustness test using a two-stage Heckman-Lee estimator 
(Heckman, 1979; Lee, 1978). As the availability of historic data on non-surviving EMNCs 
in sufficient quantities is limited at best, we made an approximation to be used in a 
robustness test instead of using this technique as the basis for our main analysis. For this 
test, we managed to collect data on 618 previously listed firms in our 21 EMs that were 
founded in the period between 1993 and 2012. By employing firm industry, age at t-1 and 
size at t-1 as our selection criteria, and delistment as the selection hazard, we were able to 
find similar results for Hypotheses 1, 2 and 3, but the coefficient for Hypothesis 4 was 
insignificant. However, due to the limited amount of data available, it should be noted that 
this additional sample was not subjected to the minimum size criterion of a market 
capitalization of 100 million USD. This might explain the lack of significance of our 
findings for Hypothesis 4, as the development of capabilities through employing a 
heterogeneous set of employees could require a minimum threshold of employees that is 
not reached by these firms.  
 
2.5 DISCUSSION 
 
Imprinting and Internationalization Barriers 
In this paper, we evaluated the impact of imprinting on the internationalization 
barriers experienced by firms. Our findings suggest that imprinting theory can be 
employed as a useful complementary perspective that builds upon the nascent literature on 
EMNC internationalization, and more broadly on internationalization theory in general. By 
applying the lens of imprinting theory and thus acknowledging the effects of different 
founding conditions, we can disentangle inter-temporal country level effects on the 
internationalization behavior of firms. As a result, we are able to explain differences in 
both firm internationalization degrees across countries, as well as across firms in the same 
country (Gammeltoft et al., 2010; Hoskisson et al., 2013), particularly in the context of 
EMs. Our findings indicate that subsequent uses of imprinting in conjunction with more 
conventional theories of internationalization, such as the OLI paradigm (Dunning, 2001) or 
incremental internationalization theory (Johanson & Valhne, 1977; 2003), allow for a 
richer model that more fully explains the internationalization behavior of firms.  
Our unpacking of the role of imprinting effects on internationalization further 
builds on the work of Sapienza et al. (2006). Where Sapienza and his colleagues 
considered an imprint created by the timing of the initiation of internationalization, and its 
relation to firm survival and firm growth, we demonstrate that environmental conditions 
create an imprint that in itself (dis-)incentivizes internationalization. Since there is a 
temporal separation between the two events, this suggests the possibility that imprints at 
one time can lead to different imprints at a later time. This opens up new potential avenues 
for research, especially in conjunction with the concept of multiple sensitive periods. 
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According to this idea, firms can experience multiple periods where they are susceptible to 
imprinting effects beyond the founding stage (Marquis & Tilcsik, 2013). Viewing 
imprinting effects in this way as multi-temporal constructs suggests even further reaching 
consequences of imprints than previously foreseen, and begets interesting future research 
opportunities. 
 
Emerging Markets and Firm Strategies 
We add to the EM literature by deepening our understanding of the uniqueness 
inherent to the continuously changing and evolving EM context, and how this affects firm 
strategies (Peng, 2003). Due to the volatility and dynamic nature of the EM setting, the 
persistence of imprinting effects, even in the face of negative feedback (Kilduff, 1992), is 
likely to be even more pronounced than in developed markets. Thus, we argue that the 
extent to which EMNCs internationalize is not just a matter of current firm and market 
conditions (e.g. Cuervo-Cazurra & Genc, 2008; Luo & Tung, 2007; Ramamurti & Singh, 
2008), but is also contingent on the extent to which a firm‘s founding conditions 
incentivized internationalization behavior. Even though our research is concerned with the 
analysis of internationalization outcomes, it highlights the unique relevance of imprinting 
in the EM context, which is likely to reach beyond influences on internationalization. 
While institutional perspectives have thus far been the driving explanation for the 
divergent strategic behavior of EM firms in general (Hoskisson et al., 2003; Peng, 2003; 
Wright, Filatotchev, Hoskisson & Peng, 2005), we argue that imprinting theory is a 
valuable complementary perspective to theories of organizational strategy that, given the 
uniquely dynamic nature of the EM context, provides further insights into the strategic 
decision making of firms not otherwise noticeable in more stable and developed 
economies.  
This particular context also raises questions regarding the longevity of imprints, 
as the degree of persistence or decay of imprinting effects is currently largely unexplored 
(Marquis & Tilcsik, 2013). We predicted that the effects of imprinting are more 
pronounced in the EM context as their volatile nature provides multiple, clearly 
distinguishable sets of founding configurations. However, it is also possible that this 
volatile situation creates an imprint of its own, steering organizational designs towards 
malleable structures that can quickly adapt to rapidly changing circumstances (Child, 
1972; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). Further research is needed to determine how the 
dynamism of the founding conditions influence the strength of imprints, and in which 
contexts imprints are expected to be more pronounced. 
 
Imprinting and Strategic Choice 
We contribute to the imprinting literature by presenting the possibility that firm 
level imprints can, to a certain extent, be created. By identifying environmental imprinting 
factors that can be shaped by state intervention (Knill & Lehmkulh, 2002; Milner & 
Keohane, 1996), we show that environmental imprinting effects are not solely the result of 
accidental outcomes. Instead, environmental imprints can be a product of deliberate 
design, a perspective that has previously been restricted to entrepreneurial imprints 
(Johnson, 2007). Our study thus reduces the deterministic nature of environmental 
imprinting by extending the agentic perspective beyond entrepreneurial influences. This 
implication extends the debate between environmental determinism and strategic choice 
(Bourgeois, 1984; Hrebiniak & Joyce, 1985, Judge at al., 2015) by introducing another 
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option: governmental strategic choice that leads to firm environmental determinism. This 
approach constitutes a novel way of looking at state intervention, and warrants further 
research that explores the full extent of influence the state can indirectly exert on firm 
strategies.  
A further implication of our work is that while we propose that although state 
intervention introduces a degree of agency with regard imprinting effects, we consequently 
suggest that policy changes may have weaker consequences for incumbent firms than 
commonly assumed. Since incumbent firms are also constrained by imprints from their 
founding conditions, the intervention of the state at later stages is likely to be somewhat 
limited. State intervention policies are therefore more likely to be effective if oriented 
towards firms yet to be founded, rather than firms already in existence. This opens up 
future research opportunities by analyzing the effectiveness of state policies with respect to 
the potential constraints of earlier policies. 
 
Limitations and Future Research Directions 
The results of our study should be interpreted in light of several limitations that 
suggest opportunities for future research. First, while our research does account for 
changes in the institutional context of the firm over time, our measure of 
internationalization does not allow us to take the moment of internationalization into 
account. As a result, contemporary conditions at the time of founding could conceivably 
play a role in determining the extent to which firms internationalize. Further research could 
follow up on the work of Sapienza et al. (2006) to determine the effect of a possible 
additional imprint stemming from the internationalization itself.  
Second, our results could be influenced by our choice of dependent variable. Our 
analysis employed foreign subsidiaries over total subsidiaries as a dependent variable, but 
using a different operationalization of internationalization, such as FSTS or FATA, could 
lead to different results (Sullivan, 1994). Given that different conceptualizations of 
internationalization require different sets of capabilities (Peng, 2001), it would stand to 
reason that different imprinting factors could possibly play a role in producing different 
‗types‘ of internationalization or that the imprinting factors we examined have a different 
effect. Further research is required to investigate the effects of imprinting on different 
conceptualizations of internationalization.  
Third, we examined the effect of imprints in the EM context due to its volatility. 
However, this inherent volatility could influence the extent to which firms are affected by 
imprinting effects. Prior knowledge of a changing environment could lead to the creation 
of firms that are inherently more flexible or adaptable, which would influence the strength 
of imprinting effects. Additional research could expand this idea and apply it to the 
developed market context, to determine whether the effects of imprints in a more stable 
environment provide similar results. 
Our research also does not take into account the possibility that imprinting might 
occur after firm founding. Transition periods in firms, for example when a new CEO is 
appointed, usher in a period of time when a firm is particularly susceptible to influences 
from its environment, which can subsequently lead to the creation of a new set of imprints 
(Marquis & Tilcsik, 2013). This can also occur as new firm features and practices do not 
replace older ones, but are rather layered upon them (Cooper, Hinings, Greenwood & 
Brown, 1996). These new sets of imprinting factors could interact with the old imprints, 
either by enhancing, subduing or modifying them, which, in turn, could lead to 
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confounding effects in our analysis that are currently unaccounted for. Future research 
should take this into account and empirically examine the influence of new sets of 
imprinting factors on older imprints. 
Finally, survivor bias may influence our findings. As Sapienza and colleagues 
(2006) have pointed out, the decision of firms to internationalize is not necessarily 
beneficial to its survival. While we recognize this shortcoming and therefore attempted to 
conduct a robustness test by using a Heckman-Lee estimation to control for this potential 
sample bias, the limitations placed on our analysis by the unavailability of the appropriate 
data limits the interpretability of our results. Thus while our tentative approximation of 
correcting for this sample bias does not indicate any immediate issues regarding a survivor 
bias in our sample, we cannot rule out the possibility that any effects from a potential 
survival bias are completely absent. Future research could analyze the entire set of EM 
firms founded since 1993 to determine whether or not the imprinting factors that facilitate 
internationalization might also hinder firm survival, due to the inherent additional risk 
attached to internationalization.  
 
 
Conclusions 
Recent research has documented the rapid rise of EMNCs in the global 
marketplace. This study improves our understanding of these powerful economic actors by 
employing the lens of imprinting theory. We introduce a model of the direct effects of 
historical conditions on subsequent EMNC internationalization, related to the imprints of 
availability of skilled labor, access to capital, the presence of foreign MNEs, and 
population heterogeneity. In doing so, we identified a promising new direction in which to 
further develop our understanding of firm internationalization. Our research emphasizes 
that the nascent theory of EMNC internationalization, which has thus far primarily stressed 
the influence of contemporaneous factors, needs to be broadened to consider the role of 
imprinting. Modeling non-contemporaneous factors is necessary, as our study shows that 
environmental conditions at the time of founding tend to have a lasting effect on EMNC 
strategy. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
FOUNDING MUNIFICENCE AND FIRM PERFORMANCE: A CONTINGENCY 
APPROACH TO EVALUATING IMPRINTING EFFECTS 
 
In this study we examine the effect of the founding environment of a firm on its future 
performance. We focus on munificence, as the availability of resources plays a key role in 
determining the organizational structure and strategies that a firm chooses to adopt. Based 
on arguments from imprinting theory, we develop hypotheses on how founding 
munificence and changes in munificence shape organizational future performance. A 2-
stage Heckman selection analysis of over 2,000 U.S. firms founded between 1997 and 
2012 provides evidence that high levels of founding munificence are detrimental in 
developing the skills and capabilities that help future firm performance. The larger the 
differences between founding and current munificence, the stronger the negative impact 
from munificence becomes. In addition, we find that the direction in which munificence 
changes since founding has an impact on imprinting effects: increases in munificence 
allow firms founded during times of scarcity to start exploiting their developed 
capabilities, while decreases in munificence serve as a leveler that reduces the overall 
effect of imprinting. 
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3.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Extant research has shown that the external conditions a firm is subjected to at its time of 
founding have a notable impact on its future. A growing body of literature has examined 
how the decisions of firms in their early stage manifest in later years through the lens of 
imprinting theory (e.g. Boeker, 1989; Kriauciunas & Kale, 2006; Marquis & Huang, 2010; 
Marquis & Tilcsik, 2013; Shinkle & Kriauciunas, 2012; Stinchcombe & March, 1965). 
Central to this perspective is the notion that the prior experiences of an organization at key 
periods in their life can have an enduring impact on the organizations‘ future. Effects from 
imprinting can have consequences for a wide range of organizational outcomes, such as 
internationalization capabilities, capacity to change, or acquisition propensity (e.g. 
Kriauciunas & Kale, 2006; Lounsbury, 2007; Marquis & Huang, 2010; Sapienza, Autio, 
George, & Zahra, 2006).  
 Research has also demonstrated the existence of a link between founding 
conditions and future firm survival chances (Dobrev & Gotsopoulos, 2010; Swaminathan, 
1996). However, the link between founding conditions and future performance is less well-
established. More importantly, while imprinting exaptation (Marquis & Huang, 2010) and 
imprinting decay (Marquis & Tilcsik, 2013) shed some light on the dynamics between 
imprints and the environment, we still know little about this overall interaction. In 
particular, how changes in the environment over time affect imprinting is a gap that has not 
yet been explored.  
We therefore set out to examine the imprinting process from a contingency-based 
approach, and analyze altering conditions under which imprinting effects might become 
more or less pronounced. To do so, we start with an analysis of how the munificence of a 
firm‘s founding environment influences its future performance. We then examine how the 
environment develops over time to explain how the same imprints might result in 
heterogeneous outcomes for different organizations. If the manifestation of imprints is 
contingent on the development of the external context, then better understanding this 
dynamic will help shed light on how imprinting mechanisms function. 
To test the hypotheses we present in this paper, we constructed a panel data set of 
publicly listed firms founded in the United States in the period between 1997 and 2012, 
consisting of over 2,000 firms and 10,000 firm-year observations. We focus on different 
industries and years which provides a large degree of heterogeneity in the founding 
conditions in our sample. We collected yearly data on the munificence conditions in the 
environment for each industry, allowing us to analyze both founding and future yearly 
conditions for each firm. We tested our hypotheses with two-stage Heckman selection with 
firm survival as our first stage selection, and find empirical evidence that supports our 
hypotheses. Specifically, we find that munificence during firm founding has a negative 
impact on future firm performance. Increased differences between current and founding 
munificence likewise negatively impact firm performance. Additionally, we demonstrate 
that this effect occurs predominantly when the environment sees an increase in 
munificence compared to founding conditions. 
We propose to make three contributions to the literature with this paper. First, our 
paper builds on prior work that examines the mechanisms underpinning imprinting effects 
(e.g. Johnson, 2007; Marquis, 2003; Noorderhaven & Harzing, 2003) by demonstrating 
that the extent to which imprinting effects manifest is contingent on the difference between 
current and founding conditions. This insight provides insights into the debate on how the 
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contingencies of imprinting affect the extent of their impact, which until now has mainly 
been restricted to the dimension of time (Marquis & Tilcsik, 2013). Second, we further 
contribute to the imprinting literature by demonstrating that the way external conditions 
evolve over time has an effect on the effects of imprinting itself. This idea shows that 
when evaluating the consequences of imprinting effects, we cannot just examine their 
impact in a vacuum, and must account for the developments of contemporary conditions as 
well. Third, we contribute to the literature on environmental munificence imprinting (e.g. 
Marquis & Tilcsik, 2013; Oon, Prabhu, & Singh, 2015; Tilcsik, 2014) by demonstrating 
the interplay between munificence and the capacity for imprinting effects to manifest. Our 
paper shows that imprint effects are contingent on their contemporary environment, and 
the scope this provides to organizations to pursue the different strategic directions that 
imprinting effects incentivize. This finding has implications for not just the imprinting 
effects stemming from founding munificence, but implies that the impact of all imprinting 
effects are contingent on the extent to which an organization‘s environment allows for 
differentiation. 
 
3.2 THEORY 
 
Environmental munificence 
One of the greatest contingencies that organizations face is that of their external 
environment (Goll & Rasheed, 2004). Over time, a large body of work has emerged 
documenting how a variety of environmental factors shape organizational structures, 
strategies and outcomes. Of all the existing factors in the external environment of an 
organization, few are arguably as important for explaining strategic behaviors and 
organizational outcomes as a firm‘s external munificence (Castrogiovanni, 1991).  
The concept of munificence generally refers to the availability of resources to an 
organization, as well as its capacity to support organizational growth (Aldrich, 1979; 
Castrogiovanni, 1991; Dess & Beard, 1984). The ability of firms to acquire resources is 
therefore directly related to the level of munificence in its environment (Tyebjee & Bruno, 
1982). The literature on environmental munificence frequently refers to its role in molding 
organizational structures, decision making, and stakeholder satisfaction (Goll & Rasheed, 
2004, e.g. 1997; Tushman & Anderson, 1986; Yasai-Ardekani, 1989). 
The munificence of the environment is particularly important for newly founded 
firms, as they are generally more cash constrained (Cabral & Mata, 2003), and have not yet 
developed legitimacy in financial markets (Diamond, 1989). It is therefore not surprising 
that prior work has established the existence of a link between the levels of environmental 
founding munificence a firm experiences, and its future organizational outcomes. 
Founding endowments impact the key strategic decisions of firms regarding their structure, 
model and boundaries (Swaminathan, 1996). For example, Carroll and Hannan (1989, 
2004) showed through their construct of density delay that the level of organizational 
density and competitiveness at founding has a lasting effect on a firm‘s future mortality 
rate. Kimberly (1979) found that environmental conditions caused initial strategic choices 
to have an enduring effect on the behavior and performance of organizations. Other work 
demonstrated that the availability of resources during founding has a lasting effect on 
subsequent rates of change across a variety of organizational process (Tucker, Singh, & 
Meinhard, 1990). 
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Founding conditions 
When it comes to the initial survival of organizations, one of the most important 
determinants is the extent to which organizations fit with their external environment 
(Hannan & Freeman, 1977). New ventures generally suffer from a liability of newness 
(Abatecola, Cafferata, & Poggesi, 2012; Freeman, Carroll, & Hannan, 1983; Stinchcombe 
& March, 1965), which forces them to be more cognizant of their surrounding conditions. 
It is during this time, when new organizations are still lacking in experience, that they start 
to develop their organizational routines and build relations with potential suppliers and 
customers (Abatecola et al., 2012). Simultaneously, due to their newness these firms have 
not yet acquired any legitimacy (Singh, Tucker, & House, 1986). In order to obtain 
legitimacy and increase their chances of survival, new ventures are therefore likely to 
adopt the routines and practices that are perceived as legitimate during their time of 
founding. In this way the initial founding conditions of the firm can have a significant 
impact on how firms are structured to operate. 
A particularly important founding characteristic is the level of environmental 
munificence, as munificence directly influences the breadth of strategic options available 
to organizations (Aragón-Correa & Sharma, 2003). By being founded in a more munificent 
environment, organizations face less competitive pressure and have more freedom to 
deviate from the norm (CITE). As a consequence, munificent founding environments 
allow for more diverse organizational strategies, since it will be easier to realize profits 
with sub-optimal approaches. On the other hand, more lenient founding conditions are 
likely to weed out deviating organizations much more rapidly, resulting in a much smaller, 
but also more homogenous, group of surviving firms. 
 
Imprinting 
According to imprinting theory, at key points in time certain aspects in the 
immediate surrounding context of an organization can become internalized, which then 
persist with the organization in subsequent years (Marquis & Tilcsik, 2013; Stinchcombe 
& March, 1965). These conditions consequently continue to influence several 
organizational characteristics, such as its structure and behavior. The imprinting of firms 
occurs during critical points in the firms‘ lifespan (Marquis & Tilcsik, 2013), of which the 
founding period is usually the most important (Carroll & Hannan, 2004; Johnson, 2007; 
Sapienza et al., 2006). At the time of founding, two predominant sources of imprinting 
effects exist: the founder of the organization, who can create a foundational blueprint that 
continues to persist (Johnson, 2007), and the external environment of the organization. In 
the latter case, imprinting transpires in several stages. First, a selection process occurs 
because a liability of newness ensures that only a select set of organizations is viable and 
legitimate (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Freeman et al., 1983). The availability of resources 
in the environment then further constrains or incentivizes firms in certain directions. As a 
consequence, the organizational structure that firms implement, the strategic paths they 
chose to pursue, the routines that they adopt, and the development of capabilities they 
initialize emerge as a result of the organizational environment (Marquis & Tilcsik, 2013). 
This implies that the historical conditions under which an organization is founded have a 
long-lasting impact that continues to influence the behaviors and outcomes of the 
organization many years later, even though these initial conditions might have since 
changed or disappeared. 
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The concept of imprinting has seen a wide variety of applications in the literature 
with regards to organizational outcomes thus far. For example, Kriauciunas and Kale  
(2006) have discovered that firms founded in former communist countries during the 
communist regime tend to exhibit a ―socialist imprint‖ that inhibits their capacity to 
change. Boeker (1988) conducted research on how founding conditions shape the beliefs 
and attitudes of the founding entrepreneur, with consequences for subsequent choices and 
long-term strategic development in the organization.  Marquis and Huang (2010) have 
argued that the founding conditions of banks influenced their capability to manage 
dispersed branches, which subsequently influenced their propensity to engage in 
acquisitions. Results from Lounsbury (2007) showed that imprinting effects can cause 
competing logics in organizations with regard to the social organizations of firms and 
industries. And Sapienza et al. (2006) identified an imprint stemming from early 
internationalization that influenced future firm survival and growth probabilities. 
The imprinting of firms can therefore occur in various ways, but there are several 
commonalities in why these initial conditions tend to persist within an organization. One 
contributing factor is that of organizational inertia (Hannan & Freeman, 1984). After 
establishing a certain type of behavior within the organization, practices become routinized 
and institutionalized (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). Barring a subsequent major 
organizational reform, which brings large amounts of uncertainty and can therefore be 
costly and hazardous, the initial cognitive outlook of organizations frequently ossifies 
(Nelson & Winter, 1982). In addition, the development of capabilities can result in either 
core rigidities or competence traps, further reinforcing the prevailing nature of initial 
organizational decisions (Szulanski, 1996). As a result of these inertial forces the initial 
choices of the organization persist with organizations, even though signals from the 
organizational environment might indicate that the firm is pursuing a suboptimal 
configuration or strategy (Kilduff, 1992; Milanov & Fernhaber, 2009).  
Imprinting effects are also reinforced through escalating commitment in 
management (Bateman & Zeithaml, 1989). Firms often fail to adjust their organizational 
strategy as a consequence of a not wanting to waste initially invested resources, causing 
them to ―face a downward organizational inertia in the sense that even in the face of an 
economic incentive to downsize, they fail to retrench” (Van Witteloostuijn, 1998:509). 
Political resistance within an organization can further reinforce inertia and hinder change 
(Tushman, Virany, & Romanelli, 1985). As a result, firms tend to stick with their initially 
chosen strategies regardless of future occurrences in the external context (Kraatz & Zajac, 
2001; Miller & Chen, 1994). 
 
Munificence, imprinting and firm performance 
Due to the effects of imprinting, founding conditions can influence future firm 
success in several ways. Prior research has shown that founding conditions have an 
influence on a firm‘s future chances of survival (Geroski, Mata, & Portugal, 2010). For 
example, during harsher times unemployment increases, and unemployed individuals are 
more likely to establish new firms (Evans & Leighton, 1989). But these firms are often 
established out of necessity rather than because of an identified competitive advantage or 
need in the market, and subsequently their survival chances tend to be lower (Pfeiffer & 
Reize, 2000). However, if firms do manage to survive harsher founding conditions, they 
will have experienced a ―trial by fire‖ and are more likely to survive in the future 
(Swaminathan, 1996). 
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Firm performance is likely to benefit from adverse founding conditions as well. 
First of all, in line with the ―trial by fire‖ model from Swaminathan (1996), stricter 
conditions will quickly weed out organizations that are likely to be unprofitable. This also 
helps firms to benefit from vicarious learning. If unstainable business practices are rapidly 
weeded out, this will serve as a selection effect for other firms to identify the behaviors 
that are successful (Delacroix & Rao, 1994; Miner & Haunschild, 1995).  
Second, munificent environments allow firms to pursue goals that are not strictly 
profit maximizing (Jensen & Meckling, 1976), thereby instilling less urgency in firms to 
continuously strive for optimizing behaviors and routines that result in better performance. 
Times of scarcity can create organizations that are much more likely to engage in cost-
cutting measures to improve their performance (Schoar & Zuo, 2017). Firms need to 
continuously evaluate the added value of their current resources, and divest them if need to 
generate the required slack to obtain superior resources (Sirmon & Hitt, 2003). Firms that 
are founded during high munificence are likely to be less critical than firms founded during 
scarcer times, and will therefore be less active in laying of human capital, divesting 
noncore businesses or spinning off specific assets that generate subpar returns (Sirmon, 
Hitt, & Ireland, 2007). Firms founded during scarcity are therefore likely to perform much 
better when the munificence in their environment increases and new opportunities open up.  
Third, low munificence at founding increases the need for firms to manage their 
resources carefully, as they might not be readily available at all times (Sirmon et al., 2007). 
The development of managerial skills and resource handling capabilities is therefore likely 
to be superior in scarce environments (Keats & Hitt, 1988). Firms founded in munificent 
times have fewer needs to develop in-house capabilities, as their environment allows them 
to outsource various capabilities more easily. In the cases where resources and capabilities 
do need to be outsourced, limited opportunities in the founding environment cause 
organizations to pursue tighter connections with external parties as a buffer against their 
scarce environment (Zhang, Tan, & Tan, 2016), providing them with additional unique 
resources that can be exploited later. These factors combined contribute to preparing firms 
founded during scarcity much better for future times than firms found during more 
munificent periods. Therefore: 
 
H1: The level of environmental munificence at the time of firm founding has a 
negative relation with future firm performance. 
 
Founding and current munificence 
One of the predominant characteristics of imprinting effects is their persistence in 
organizations regardless of subsequent changes in the environment (Marquis & Tilcsik, 
2013; Stinchcombe & March, 1965). Imprinting effects are therefore more likely to be 
noticeable when the environment drastically changes. Conversely, when the environment 
remains static, imprinting effects are likely to indistinguishable from contemporary 
influences. The impact from imprinting is therefore likely to increase when contemporary 
conditions diverge further from founding conditions. 
Moreover, imprints are indicative of the behaviors that are appropriate for a given 
context, and are therefore a  reflection of the environment from the time of imprinting 
(Marquis & Tilcsik, 2013; Stinchcombe & March, 1965). When the environment changes 
imprints can become unsuitable for the new context. For example, firms founded during 
the communist regime in formerly communist countries faced severe difficulties when 
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forced to adapt to a new free-market environment due to their imprints (Kriauciunas & 
Kale, 2006). The more the context changes, the greater the chance that organizational 
imprints are no longer appropriate. This could cause a misfit between the firm and its 
environment, which would be detrimental to firm performance. Therefore: 
 
H2: The difference between founding and current munificence has a negative 
relation with firm performance. 
 
Direction of munificence changes 
The munificence of an organizations‘ environment is unlikely to remain identical 
over time. However, the direction in which munificence changes can influence the way 
imprinting effects manifest. Increasing munificence is generally indicative of a growing 
industry and implies the emergence of new opportunities, while decreasing munificence 
entails a decline in opportunities and room for organizational decision making (Koka, 
Madhavan, & Prescott, 2006). Since imprints are observable through the actions of 
organizations (e.g. Sapienza et al., 2006; Shinkle, Kriauciunas, & Hundley, 2013)), 
reducing the decision space of organizations is likely to inhibit the effects from imprinting 
making (Yasai-Ardekani, 1989).  
When there is high munificence, the opportunity for imprints to become 
detrimental increases. For example, firms founded during munificent times tend to hold 
higher levels of organizational slack (Sharfman, Wolf, Chase, & Tansik, 1988). However, 
structurally employing unutilized slack is frequently detrimental to performance. Slack can 
be used by managers to pursue private goals that are not in line with the owners of the 
firm, such as empire building (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). The existence of slack can also 
serve to dissuade firms from divesting unprofitable projects (Staw, Sandelands, & Dutton, 
1981), or it can act as a waste of efficiency in general (Williamson, 1964). Slack might aid 
firms during times of scarcity to provide a financial buffer of working capital, as the 
environment will be lacking in available resources. But when munificence increases the 
usefulness of slack diminishes. Having too much slack then becomes a waste in efficiency, 
as the capital could be repurposed towards avenues that generate more profitability 
(D‘aveni, 1989).  
We also know from prior work that the leverage ratio of listed firms tends to be 
stable over time, regardless of its appropriateness (Hanssens, Deloof, & Vanacker, 2016; 
Lemmon, Roberts, & Zender, 2008; Welch, 2004; Wu & Yeung, 2012), which strongly 
implies that this characteristic is imprinted in organizations (Levinthal, 2003). These debt 
levels tend to be higher for firms founded during times of munificence, as investors tend to 
be more conservative and prevent firms from adopting large levels of debt during times of 
scarcity (Perez-de Toledo, Giraldez-Puig, & Hurtado-Gonzalez, 2016). But having 
structurally higher debt levels can be detrimental to firm performance, as a high debt-to-
equity levels result in larger interest payments for organizations, thereby lowering their 
profitability (Weiner & Mahoney, 1981). High debt levels also limit the capacity of firms 
to honor their contracts (Banerjee, Dasgupta, & Kim, 2008), limiting a firms capacity to 
respond to new opportunities if munificence increases.  
Finally, firms founded during scarcer times also tend to make use of bricolage, the 
capability of ―making do with whatever is at hand‖ by applying combinations of the 
resources at hand to new problems and opportunities (Miner, Bassof, & Moorman, 2001; 
Weick, 1993). Scarce founding conditions therefore frequently force organizations to 
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develop capabilities that allow them to recombine resources for new purposes (Baker & 
Nelson, 2005). When munificence increases new resources become available, and the 
capacity to use bricolage makes firms from scarcer times better equipped to exploit these 
new opportunities.  
The effects of munificence or scarcity at the time of founding are therefore likely 
to be contingent on how munificence develops over time. When munificence increases, the 
negative performance effects from imprinting are likely to be more pronounced, while they 
are expected to disappear as munificence decreases. Therefore: 
 
H3a: The level of environmental munificence at the time of firm founding has a 
negative relation with future firm performance if munificence increased since founding. 
H3b: The difference between founding and current munificence has a negative 
relation with future firm performance if munificence increased since founding. 
 
H4a: The level of environmental munificence at the time of founding has no effect 
on future firm performance if munificence decreased since founding 
H4b: The difference between founding and current munificence has no effect on 
future firm performance if munificence decreased since founding. 
 
3.3 METHODOLOGY 
 
Sample 
We collected data from a number of different sources to test our hypotheses. We 
started by constructing a sample of publicly listed firms that were founded in the US in the 
period between 1997 and 2012. The benefit of this time period is that it provides a 
sufficiently large time lapse to track imprinting effects still having adequate access to 
historical data available. To incorporate heterogeneity in founding conditions, we focused 
our analysis on the founding conditions of firms at the industry level. At the same time, 
since all firms are founded in the US they still exhibit a degree of commonality, which can 
help to reduce the influence of some potential confounding effects that occur at a more 
global level.  
We identified the firms in our sample by searching for publicly listed firms based 
on their founding year and location using Orbis, a database that tracks information on close 
to 180 million private and public organizations worldwide. However, firm-level data in 
Orbis is restricted to the year 2006 and onwards. We therefore cross-referenced the firms 
we found with CUSIP codes from Compustat, a database that documents more fine-
grained firm level characteristics of publicly listed firms over a longer time period, but 
does not track firm founding information. Our initial selection criteria yielded 2988 firms 
that were suitable for analysis, for which we collected yearly observations for all firms 
where possible. After discarding observations with missing data, our sample contained 
1818 firms with 9426 firm year observations for our hypothesis testing. 
 
Variables and methodology 
The key variable of interest for our hypotheses is that of the environmental 
munificence of the organizations. To operationalize munificence, we employed the 
common measure of industry growth on the industry level (Dess & Beard, 1984; Nielsen & 
Nielsen, 2013), based on chain-type quantity indices for value added (BEA; 2017). This 
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operationalization serves as a good indicator for the growth of an industry compared to the 
national aggregate (Moyer, Planting, Fahim-Nader, & Lum, 2004). 
For each firm-year observation we collected data both for the founding year, and 
the year where we measure our firm-level variables. All of our analyses include both 
founding and current munificence variables, to control for the contemporary influences of 
munificence (Geroski et al., 2010). We collected the data on environmental munificence 
from the Bureau of Economic Analysis. The correlation between current and founding 
munificence in our data is only 0.338, indicating that the munificence of the environment 
experiences significant changes in our chosen sample period. 
For our hypotheses we were interested in performance of firms across time. In 
accordance with prior work on organizational performance, we operationalized this 
variable in two steps. First, we calculated each firm‘s yearly profitability by dividing net 
returns by its total assets to calculate their return on assets (ROA). Then, to correct for 
skewedness in our distribution, we therefore took the log of 1 + ROA as an adjustment.  
 We also included some control variables in our analyses. First, we controlled for 
organizational age, as the age of the firm might have an impact on the strength of 
imprinting effects (Marquis & Tilcsik, 2013). We also controlled for size, operationalized 
as logged total assets, since larger firms are more susceptible to imprinting due to their 
larger amount of institutionalized practices and routinized behaviors (DiMaggio & Powell, 
1983; Nelson & Winter, 1982). To ensure that we are not simply capturing population 
ecology effects, we controlled for the density of organizations by taking the total number 
of firms per industry, with alternative operationalizations of number of firms per industry 
per founding state as a robustness test (Anderson & Tushman, 2001; Carroll & Hannan, 
2000). Finally we created industry dummies for separate industries based on 2-digit SIC 
codes.  
Since there is a significant risk of survivor bias in our sample, we need to correct 
for their effect. We therefore employed two-stage Heckman selection to test our 
hypotheses (Heckman, 1976, 1979), using the ―SampleSelection‖ package in statistical 
software analysis tool R, with Rstudio version 1.0.143. In this approach, we use firm 
survival as our dependent variable in the first stage, with munificence, firm age, size and 
industry density all serving as first-stage predictors. 
Since our sample contains firms that are founded in different industries, have 
varying founding years and diverse lifespans, we also conducted robustness tests using an 
unbalanced panel data approach (Biørn, 2004). We conducted our analyses with the ―plm‖ 
package using R. All results were in line with our earlier findings. For all models we 
analyzed the variance inflation factors (VIF) to determine any potential problems with 
multicollinearity. All VIF scores were below 10, indicating that multicollinearity was not 
an issue with our dataset (Kutner, Nachtsheim, Neter, & Li, 2005). 
 
 
3.4 RESULTS 
 
We present our analysis of founding munificence on firm performance in Table 
3.1. Model 1 includes only the controls, while Model 2 contains our findings with regard to 
our Hypothesis 1. The model shows that founding munificence has a significant negative 
effect on future firm performance, providing support for Hypothesis 1. The model also 
shows a positive significant effect for current munificence, in line with prior work that  
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TABLE 3.1 
Founding munificence on organizational performance 
S1: Survival Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Constant -0.187 (0.047) *** -0.183 (0.048) *** -0.199 (0.047) *** 
Age 0.105 (0.006) *** 0.108 (0.000) *** 0.108 (0.006) *** 
Size 0.198 (0.016) *** 0.201 (0.000) *** 0.200 (0.016) *** 
Density -0.000 (0.00) *** -0.000 (0.000) *** -0.000 (0.000) *** 
Current munificence   -0.004 (0.002) *   
Founding munificence   -0.126 (0.154)    
Munificence difference     0.001 (0.001)  
S2: Performance      
Constant -0.376 (0.086) *** -0.352 (0.080) *** -0.353 (0.082) *** 
Age 0.002 (0.005)  0.002 (0.004)  0.001 (0.005)  
Size 0.107 (0.010) *** 0.105 (0.009) *** 0.105 (0.009) *** 
Density -0.000 (0.000) ** -0.000 (0.000) ** -0.000 (0.000) ** 
Current munificence   0.000 (0.000)    
Founding munificence   -0.001 (0.000) ***   
Munificence difference     -0.001 (0.000) ** 
 
      
R
2
 0.1499  0.1522  0.1518  
N
 
6910  6775  6789  
*** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05;. * p < 0.10   
Standard errors in parentheses. 
Industry controls have been omitted 
 
 
contemporary munificence is generally a positive antecedent to firm performance (e.g. 
Castrogiovanni, 1991). 
We present our findings on the relation between munificence changes and firm 
performance in Model 3. The model shows that changes in munificence have a significant 
negative effect on future firm performance, providing support for Hypothesis 2.  
To determine how munificence affects organizational outcomes, we conducted 
two additional analyses, where we split the sample observations based on whether 
munificence increased or decreased compared to the time of founding. Table 3.2 reports 
our results for observations that saw an increase in munificence compared to the time of 
founding, while Table 3.3 reports the sample with decreasing munificence. The results 
from these tables indicate that there is no imprinting effect when munificence decreases 
compared to the time of founding, while imprints remain significant for the increase in 
munificence condition. 
 
3.5 DISCUSSION 
 
This study set out to examine the consequences of founding munificence on future firm 
performance. We observe that founding munificence negatively affects the future  
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TABLE 3.2 
Increasing munificence 
S1: Survival Model 1 Model 2 
Constant -0.168 (0.070) * -0.178 (0.067) ** 
Age 0.120 (0.008) *** 0.120 (0.007) *** 
Size 0.180 (0.002) *** 0.177 (0.021) *** 
Density -0.000 (0.000) *** -0.000 (0.000) *** 
Current munificence -0.009 (0.003) **   
Founding munificence -0.002 (0.002)    
Munificence difference   0.000 (0.002)  
S2: Performance    
Constant -0.345 (0.097) *** -0.339 (0.101) *** 
Age 0.002 (0.005)  0.002 (0.006)  
Size 0.104 (0.010) *** 0.104 (0.010) *** 
Density -0.000 (0.000) * -0.000 (0.000)  
Current munificence 0.001 (0.001)    
Founding munificence -0.001 (0.000) *   
Munificence difference   -0.001 (0.000) ** 
 
    
R
2
 0.1512  0.1515  
N
 
3883  3883  
*** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05;. * p < 0.10   
Standard errors in parentheses. 
2-stage Heckman, stage 1 is survival, stage 2 is performance 
Industry controls have been omitted 
 
performance of a firm. With this paper we add to the literature on imprinting and 
environmental munificence, and we propose to make three contributions.  
First, our paper shows that the magnitude of imprinting effects is contingent on the 
changes in the environment between current and founding conditions. Since the 
manifestation of imprinting occurs through a reflection of founding conditions, any proper 
evaluation of imprinting effects can only occur when there is discernable change between 
the founding and current environment. Whereas imprinting research thus far primarily 
focused on time as a contingency factor in evaluating imprinting effects, by means of 
imprinting decay (Marquis & Tilcsik, 2013), we show that the magnitude of environmental 
changes is an important predictor as well. Future work accounting for imprinting effects 
that are not dichotomous or categorical in nature can control for this contingency by 
incorporating the extent of environmental changes in their analysis. 
Second, our paper demonstrates that the effects of imprinting are dynamic, and 
are dependent on how the source of the external imprint develops over time. This implies 
that it is not sufficient to account for the extent of changes in the environment of 
organizations, but the direction of changes as well. This discovery ties in with earlier work 
on firm ―exaptation‖, the idea that firms can  
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TABLE 3.3 
Increasing munificence 
S1: Survival Model 1 Model 2 
Constant -0.221 (0.074) ** -0.222 (0.074) ** 
Age 0.091 (0.009) *** 0.091 (0.009) *** 
Size -0.023 (0.024) *** 0.232 (0.024) *** 
Density -0.000 (0.000) ** -0.000 (0.000) ** 
Current munificence 0.001 (0.003)    
Founding munificence -0.001 (0.003)    
Munificence difference   -0.001 (0.003)  
S2: Performance    
Constant -0.254 (0.140)  -0.256 (0.140)  
Age -0.004 (0.007)  -0.004 (0.010)  
Size 0.104 (0.018) *** -0.095 (0.018) *** 
Density -0.000 (0.000)  -0.000 (0.000)  
Current munificence -0.000 (0.001)    
Founding munificence -0.001 (0.001)    
Munificence difference   0.000 (0.000)  
 
    
R
2
 0.1518  0.1502  
N
 
2906  2906  
*** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05;. * p < 0.10   
Standard errors in parentheses. 
2-stage Heckman, stage 1 is survival, stage 2 is performance 
Industry controls have been omitted 
 
repurpose earlier developed routines or capabilities into new sources of 
competitive advantage in response to changes in the external environment (Gould, 1991). 
Prior work has shown that due to their enduring nature, imprinting effects are a prime 
application for exaptation (Marquis & Huang, 2010), and our findings provide a clear 
indication that creating current utility for imprinted effects is only feasible under certain 
developments of the external environment. 
Third, our research contributes to the environmental munificence literature 
(Castrogiovanni, 1991; Goll & Rasheed, 2004; Yasai-Ardekani, 1989), by demonstrating 
the role of environmental munificence on organizational imprinting. We show that 
founding munificence is a detriment to future firm performance, but perhaps more 
importantly, we also show that a lack of munificence puts a damper on the extent to which 
imprinting effects can manifest. This insight provides a potential explanation for a lack of 
results in other imprinting studies, and demonstrates that the lack of observable imprinting 
effects does not necessarily imply their absence, and cases of low munificence be 
explained by the inability for these imprinting effects to manifest.  
Overall, our paper aids in our understanding not only how organizational 
outcomes are in part determined by their founding environment, but also how various 
contingencies can shape the form and extent of imprinting effects.  
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Limitations and future research 
The findings of this paper should be seen in light of several limitations that 
suggest possible opportunities for further research. First, we tested our hypothesis by 
examining munificence at the industry level, and conducted robustness tests with 
munificence at the national level. While we believe that this level of analysis provides 
support for our hypotheses, we are unable to determine the true scope of activities for our 
organizations. It is therefore possible that some firms might operate in industries with 
different conditions. Similarly, the internationalization behavior of organizations could 
also create an external environment that is distinct from our operationalization. For 
example, born global firms might have an effective founding context that differs from their 
home country. Future research could further more thoroughly examine the area of 
operation to determine the source of founding conditions.  
Second, our research is currently limited to examining imprinting effects that 
stem from the external environment. A large body of literature has shown that the founder 
of an organization can also exert a strong imprinting effect (e.g. Baron, Burton, & Hannan, 
1999; Johnson, 2007). Future research could adopt a dual approach that accounts for both 
the imprints from the environmental and those of the founder in conjunction.  
 
Conclusions 
This study explores connections between environmental munificence at the time 
of founding and future firm performance of the firm through the lens of imprinting theory. 
Our results show that munificent founding conditions are detrimental to future firm 
performance, and we provide empirical support for potential mechanisms that might cause 
this. We also highlight that changes in external conditions similarly hinder organizational 
future performance. Finally, we show that the directionality of changes in the external 
environment is an important precursor to evaluating imprinting effects. Overall, our 
research emphasizes the importance of contextualizing current performance in light of 
historical conditions.  
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CHAPTER 4  
 
VICEROYS OR EMPERORS? AN INSTITUTION-BASED PERSPECTIVE ON 
MERGER AND ACQUISITION PREVALENCE AND SHAREHOLDER VALUE 
 
Abstract 
We study how cross-country variance in institutions that aim to address core agency 
problems influences consequential strategic decisions of firms around the world. Scholars 
frequently argue that the interests of minority shareholders are threatened by merger and 
acquisitions (M&As) due to principal-agency problems. Rather than acting shareholders‘ 
best interests, managers potentially act as viceroys, using M&As to cushion themselves 
from risk and extract more pay. Yet, equally salient is the issue of principal-principal 
agency, where controlling shareholders can behave as emperors who use M&As to siphon 
off assets and profits, and appropriate wealth of shareholders with fewer control rights. 
Taking an institution-based perspective on these ‗viceroy‘ and ‗emperor‘ problems, we 
conjecture that institutions aimed to address these agency problems can generate the 
desired outcome regarding M&A prevalence, but may also produce unintentional negative 
consequences for shareholder value as a side-effect. Empirical evidence covering M&As 
from 73 countries supports our hypotheses.  
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4.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Management scholars have found that the environment places a great deal of constraint on 
the strategic options open to firms (for summaries, see Heugens and Lander, 2009; Scott, 
1987; Tolbert and Zucker, 1999). Particularly when they restrain or drive consequential 
strategic decision-making, such as mergers and acquisitions (M&As), environmental 
characteristics can greatly impinge upon the strategic expansion and performance of firms.  
Scholars have therefore generated important insights about how the environment – for 
example, in terms of environmental uncertainty (e.g., Schilling and Steensma, 2002), 
network and resource dependencies (e.g., Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978), and cross-national 
differences in institutions (e.g., Dikova, Sahib and Van Witteloostuijn, 2010) – influences 
M&A prevalence and performance.  
Yet, little systematic research has built on institutional theory to explain how 
institutions that aim to address a central conundrum in M&As – i.e., whether M&As are a 
vehicle for maximizing shareholder value or for serving the self-interests of managers at 
the shareholders‘ expense (Haleblian, Devers, McNamara, Carpenter and Davison, 2009) – 
influence the prevalence and value of M&As. In fact, scholars recently observed that 
―institutional theory has been remarkably absent from M&A research‖ (Ferreira, Santos, 
de Almeida and Reis, 2014: 2556). As a result, we still have limited understanding of 
whether institutions serve to assure that M&As increase shareholder value, for example by 
effectuating gains in efficiency and market power, optimizing asset redeployment or 
disciplining management (e.g., Capron, Dussauge and Mitchell, 1998; Jensen, 1986). Or, 
whether institutions allow executives and other stakeholders to engage in M&A activity for 
self-serving reasons (e.g., Agrawal and Walkling, 1994; Deutch, Keil and Laamanen, 
2007). This is surprising, because prior research indicates that countries vary widely in the 
extent to which they have institutions in place to address such concerns (Rossi and Volpin, 
2004). We therefore seek to understand how different forms of institutional constraint that 
aim to address two types of agency problems affect M&A prevalence and shareholder 
value.   
The principal-agent problem is central to our understanding of firms‘ M&A 
behavior and performance (e.g., Desai, Kroll and Wright, 2003; Jensen, 1986; Parvinen 
and Tikkanen, 2007). Bounded by fiduciary duties, managers are expected to act as 
stewards of the firm‘s shareholders, and run it in their absence while striving for maximum 
shareholder value (Davis, Schoorman and Donaldson, 1997; Donaldson, 1990). As part of 
their duties, these stewards are expected to seek out M&A targets that provide synergies 
with the acquirer and lead to wealth gains. Yet, management scholars frequently 
emphasize that managers often engage in M&As for self-serving reasons (Devers, 
McNamara, Haleblian, and Yoder; Eisenhardt, 1989; Sanders, 2001; Shapiro, 2005), for 
example to increase the size of the firm, which is strongly related to managerial 
compensation (Tosi and Gomez-Mejia, 1989; Wright, Kroll and Elenkov, 2002), or to 
diversify cash flows, which reduces the risk of dismissal due to exceptionally weak 
performance (Amihud and Lev, 1981).  
The extent of the principal-agent problem depends on the accountability of 
managers towards shareholders (Jiraporn, Kim, Davidson and Singh, 2006), and the 
existence of legal institutions that govern this accountability by shifting power from 
managers to shareholders (Guillén and Capron, 2015). These institutions, commonly 
conceptualized as anti-director rights (ADR) (Spamann, 2009), serve to empower 
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shareholders, for example by facilitating the voting process for new director appointments, 
or reducing the percentage of votes required to call for an extraordinary general meeting of 
shareholders (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1998). Prior research in 
corporate governance has emphasized that the presence of these control mechanisms is 
necessary to prevent managers from engaging in self-benefitting behavior. Yet, the 
antecedents for these control mechanisms are institutionally derived, and as such differ 
across jurisdictions (Aguilera and Jackson, 2003; Young, Peng, Ahlstrom, Bruton and 
Jiang, 2008). In countries where these institutional regulations are absent, shareholders 
therefore run greater risk that they see their appointed stewards develop into viceroys who 
rule the firm as a personal fiefdom, and use it to extract above-market wages and other 
perquisites (Devers, et al., 2013). We metaphorically refer to this issue as the viceroy 
problem.  
However, while the classic principal-agent problem has received much attention 
in the M&A literature, the viceroys are frequently no more than vassals, subordinate to 
controlling shareholders that form the ulterior ruling party. Reigning as emperors over the 
organization, the influence of controlling shareholders can lead to a different type of 
agency problem: i.e., the principal-principal problem. This problem emerges when 
controlling shareholders (e.g., wealthy entrepreneurs or founding families) extract private 
benefits of control from the firm, defined as pecuniary gains that do not accrue to minority 
shareholders (Bethel, Hu and Wang, 2009; Dharwadkar, George and Brandes, 2000; Dyck 
and Zingales, 2004; Young et al., 2008). For example, controlling shareholders can resort 
to tunneling, whereby assets are sold from the focal firm to another firm under their control 
at prices below market value (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Bae, Kang and Kim, 2002). Or, 
controlling shareholdes can pay significant premiums for targets in which they enjoy 
greater cash flow rights, thereby directly transferring wealth from the minority 
shareholders to themselves (Albuquerque and Schroth, 2010; Dyck and Zingales, 2004).   
Besides running the risk of being expropriated by viceroys, smaller shareholders 
may therefore also fall victim to larger shareholders, especially when large controlling 
blockholders emerge as the result of an acquisition (Holderness, 2003). Controlling 
blockholders can then act as emperors, using their controlling share of the voting rights to 
siphon off the firm‘s assets and profits without regard for the interests of non-controlling 
parties. We metaphorically call this the emperor problem. The severity of this problem is 
contingent on the accountability that majority shareholders have towards minority 
shareholders (Dharwadkar et al., 2000). Similar to the viceroy problem, governments 
regulate the emperor problem through legal institutions, also known as anti-self-dealing 
laws (ASD), as conceptualized by Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer 
(1998). Examples of the institutions that address principal-principal problems include laws 
that govern the disclosure of self-dealing transactions and minimally required levels of 
approval for M&A deals from minority shareholders.  
While both agency problems are important, we know little about the legal 
conditions that determine their influence on M&A activity and how they affect post-M&A 
abnormal returns to shareholders. Since countries vary widely in terms of the development 
of dedicated institutions for governing and structuring M&A activity, we expect that the 
global M&A context will be far from universal. Instead, jurisdictions differ in the extent to 
which they have developed institutions that address managerial empire building (i.e., the 
viceroy problem) and minority shareholder expropriation by controlling shareholders (i.e., 
the emperor problem). However, the two problems do not always coincide, and institutions 
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that target one problem might neglect the other (Dyck and Zingales, 2004; La Porta, 
Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer, 1997). In this paper, we therefore set out to develop an 
institution-based perspective on M&As, and argue that the prevalence and performance of 
M&As is contingent on the presence of institutions that accost the viceroy and emperor 
problems.  
More specifically, we suggest that the institutional context influences variance in 
M&A prevalence across markets in different ways, depending on the extent to which 
institutions address the viceroy and emperor problems. Institutions that constrain the self-
serving interests of managers likely reduce the prevalence of M&As because managers 
will enjoy fewer opportunities to pursue M&As for non-financial motives. In contrast, 
legal constraints to prevent emperor problems will likely increase M&A prevalence 
because they give assurance to target firms‘ minority shareholders that the firm in which 
they are invested can be sold without fear of their wealth being siphoned away, making 
them less likely to engage in attempts to block deals (Bethel et al., 2009).  
However, we also suggest that these institutional measures come with critical 
side-effects; institutions do not only constrain M&A behavior, they also limit managerial 
discretion, thereby likely decreasing rather than increasing the extent to which 
shareholders can expect benefits from M&As. Institutions that address the emperor 
problem also have additional ramifications. By promoting a stronger information 
disclosure regime, more developed institutions lead to targets being sold for prices that are 
closer to their true value. This diminishes arbitrage opportunities and informational 
advantages for experienced acquirers, and ultimately diminishes, rather than enhances, the 
value accruing to the acquirer‘s minority shareholders.  
This paper makes three contributions. First, the institution-based view we develop 
provides novel insights about the influence of the viceroy and emperor problems on M&A 
prevalence and shareholder gains. Our findings indicate that the viceroy problem (cf. 
Eisenhardt, 1989; Jensen, 1986) needs to be nuanced and contextualized. Empire-building 
and risk-reduction through M&As are less likely to be a problem in contexts that have 
developed constraints on managerial power, but these constraints can also hurt shareholder 
value by taking away from the discretion managers need to pursue value-creating 
initiatives. Second, while larger shareholders have incentives to strictly monitor managers 
and reduce the viceroy problem (Himmelberg, Hubbard and Palia, 1999), they themselves 
can also engage in behavior that is harmful for minority shareholders (Young et al., 2008). 
We find that a strong institutional framework that focuses on preventing emperor problems 
leads to an increase in M&A activity and a decrease in M&A performance. Strong 
institutions seem to provide target organizations‘ minority shareholders with assurances to 
agree to deals without fear of their wealth being siphoned away. Yet, such leveling of the 
legal playing field also makes it more difficult for acquirers to extract shareholder value 
from M&As. Third, while a number of meta-analyses of the M&A literature have been 
instrumental in assimilating the field‘s findings and shaping its research agenda (e.g. Datta, 
Narayanan and Pinches, 1992; King, Dalton, Daily and Covin, 2004), we present findings 
that combine conventional empirical analyses with a novel meta-analysis that capitalizes 
on a recent influx of international empirical research on M&As. We demonstrate how 
firm-level factors are conditioned by contextual institutional factors, and thereby reveal not 
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only a need for greater consideration of the context in which M&As are conducted, but 
also of the limitations of transposing empirical findings on the M&A behavior of 
American firms to other institutional contexts. 
 
4.2 THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
 
The prevalence of M&As 
Globally, expenditure on M&A activity reached a total of about $31.8 trillion over the last 
decade (Dealogic, 2015), making M&As one of the most salient strategic phenomena in 
management (Cartwright and Schoenberg, 2006; Ferreira et al, 2014; Martynova and 
Renneboog, 2008). Yet, M&A behavior varies widely across contexts. Countries like the 
U.S. and U.K. enjoy longstanding M&A traditions, whereas China has only recently begun 
to experience a rapid increase in M&As (Buckley, Clegg, Cross, Liu, Voss and Zheng, 
2007). Meanwhile, firms expanding in countries like Belgium, Portugal and Spain seem to 
remain committed to organic growth strategies, and continue to lag behind firms in other 
Western countries in terms of M&A prevalence.  
M&A scholars have considered a range of antecedents to explain growth through 
M&As (e.g., Agrawal and Walking, 1994; Barkema and Schijven, 2008; Folta, 1998; 
Harzing, 2002; Jensen, 1986; Roll, 1986). However, following an in-depth review of the 
literature, Haleblian and colleagues (2009) concluded that the field focuses predominantly 
on firm-level characteristics. Several recent studies nevertheless show that factors that 
characterize the institutional context also are important for understanding M&A behavior 
(e.g., Beccalli and Frantz, 2013; Bris and Cabolis, 2008; Clougherty, 2005). This work 
suggests that the M&A process, ranging from initiation through deal completion to 
implementation, is contextually bound. Scholars have stressed, for example, that the 
institutional context, at least partially, explains why firms choose M&As over alternatives 
like joint ventures or strategic alliances for their corporate development (e.g., Drees and 
Heugens, 2013), how long firms take to complete deals (e.g., Dikova et al., 2009), and how 
successful firms are in M&As (e.g., Zhang, Zhou and Ebbers, 2011). Zhang et al. (2011) 
found that M&As are less likely to succeed if the institutional quality of the target country 
is low, while Marquis and Huang (2010) demonstrated how differences in institutional 
conditions at the time of organizational founding imprint heterogeneous propensities 
towards acquisitions as a growth vehicle. Moreover, scholars identified a variety 
institutional characteristics that shape the M&A process, such as access to credit (Di 
Giovanni, 2005), quality of accounting standards (Bris and Cabolis, 2008), strictness of 
antitrust laws (Clougherty, 2005), enforcement of laws and regulations (Meyer, Estrin, 
Bhaumik and Peng, 2009), size of equity funds (Qui, 2008), regulatory quality (Beccalli 
and Frantz, 2013), and state intervention levels (Serdar Dinc and Erel, 2013).  
Together, these findings suggest that specific institutions can help or hinder the 
effectuation of M&A transactions, over and above the influence ascribed to organizational 
factors. However, institutional theory still hardly is used as an explanatory framework in 
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M&A research (Ferreira et al., 2014), and we currently lack an institutional framing that 
addresses M&A prevalence as a function of state-level attempts to ameliorate viceroy and 
emperor problems.  
 
Shareholder gains post M&As 
Whereas M&A activity has continued to rise globally, scholars repeatedly 
emphasize that most M&As fail to deliver on the goals set for them. The first meta-
analysis of the field found that shareholders of the ―bidding or acquiring firms do not 
realize significant returns from M&As‖ (Datta et al., 1992: 80). More recent work shows 
that this bleak state of affairs continues to typify most M&As (e.g., Moeller, Schlingemann 
and Stulz, 2005). To help understand this, many scholars have set out to explain variance 
in M&A returns, often captured by various forms of abnormal returns – i.e. the difference 
between actual and expected returns to shareholders over a set period of time, as a result of 
an M&A event (e.g., Cording, Christmann & Weigelt, 2010). 
 Scholars point to a wide range of benefits associated with M&As, such as rapid 
growth, gains in market power, timely access to new resources, and opening up new 
product and geographic markets (Penrose, 1959; Shimizu, Hitt, Vaidyanath and Pisano, 
2004). Targets can also unlock potential synergies with their acquirers, particularly when 
targets are complementary to their acquirers in terms of markets and strategies (e.g., Kim 
and Finkelstein, 2009). Moreover, complementary scientific and technological knowledge 
can both contribute to post-merger innovative performance (Makri, Hitt and Lane, 2010). 
Over time, a body of work has emerged that attempts to explain when these benefits are 
more likely to occur. Much of this work emphasized organizational and deal factors, such 
as relatedness of the target to the acquirer (e.g., Capron, Hulbert, Farley and Martin, 1998), 
the method of payment used for the deal (e.g., Hayward and Hambrick, 1997), and prior 
acquisition experience of the acquirer (e.g., Haspeslagh and Jemison, 1991). However, 
while many organizational, inter-organizational and deal characteristics have been stressed, 
why M&As lead to gains or losses to shareholders is still largely unclear. In fact, based on 
an extensive meta-analysis, King et al. (2004) found that the most widely studied factors in 
M&A research hardly capture any variance in M&A outcomes. They concluded that 
―despite decades of research, what impacts the financial performance of firms engaging in 
M&A activity remains largely unexplained‖ (p. 198).  
In an effort to explain more variance in M&A performance, an emergent stream 
of research has shifted attention to factors capturing the contexts in which deals are done, 
including economic liberalism (Aguilera and Dencker, 2004), freedom of the press 
(Epstein, 2004), the prevalence of labor unions (Tian and Wang, 2015), quality of labor 
protection laws (Aguilera and Dencker, 2004), and corruption due to weaknesses of the 
legal system (Brockman, Rui and Zou, 2013). Moreover, a meta-analytic study focusing on 
cultural differences between acquirers and targets showed that, contingent on the degree of 
relatedness between firms, such differences can either help or hurt M&A performance 
(Stahl and Voight, 2008).  
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Similar to the work that scrutinizes the antecedents of M&A prevalence, the 
findings of studies that seek to explain the M&A-abnormal returns relationship similarly 
reveal that it is more contextually bound than originally assumed. The fact that institutional 
factors have largely been omitted from prior meta-analyses might therefore explain that 
these earlier studies, centered mostly on firm-level characteristics, captured relatively little 
of the extant variance in the distribution of M&A – performance effects (e.g., Datta et al., 
1992; King et al., 2004). We fill this lacuna by building on the emerging stream of context-
focused M&A research, theorizing how M&A prevalence and performance are influenced 
by country-level institutions that have been developed to deal with viceroy and emperor 
problems. 
 
An institution-based view on M&As: Ameliorating the viceroy problem 
Scholars often argue that the viceroy problem is rampant in M&A dealing because 
entrenched managers have strong incentives to engage liberally in M&A activities for self-
serving reasons (Desai et al., 2003; Devers et al., 2013; Jensen, 1976). M&As serve 
managers by building larger ‗empires‘ – creating larger firms that are associated with 
increased managerial status, power, and compensation (Devers et al., 2013; Jensen, 1986; 
Williamson, 1964). Moreover, M&As serve as a risk avoidance tool for managers because 
increased cash flow diversification protects managers against dismissal on account of poor 
performance in one business, allowing them to lead ―the quiet life‖ (Bertrand and 
Mullainathan, 2003; Hicks, 1935). As in the classic principal-agent relationship, the 
severity of the viceroy problem is contingent on the extent to which managers are held 
accountable to the firms‘ shareholders (Jiraporn et al., 2006). Corporate governance 
research emphasizes that strict control is needed to prevent managers from acting on their 
self-serving tendencies (Dominguez-Martinez, Swank and Visser, 2006).  
Given these stark conclusions, it is not surprising that many countries have 
attempted to develop legal measures against viceroy problems, predominantly by shifting 
power from managers to minority shareholders (Guillén and Capron, 2015; Jackson, 2010; 
Peng, 2004). One commonly used way of capturing these measures is the anti-director 
rights index (or ADR index), developed by La Porta and his co-authors (1998) and later 
revisited by Djankov and his associates (2008). This is a formative index that captures the 
extent to which (minority) shareholders are protected against managerial opportunism 
across a variety of national jurisdictions. The index is composed of country-level elements 
that capture shareholder influence, such as the adoption of provisions allowing for proxy 
voting, the prerequisite requirement to deposit shares prior to shareholder meetings, the 
adoption of measures allowing cumulative voting, the presence of a mechanism protecting 
the rights of oppressed minorities, and the ease of calling for an extraordinary general 
meeting of shareholders (La Porta et al., 1998). Collectively, these elements indicate the 
extent to which legal requirements are in place that seek to curtail self-motivated 
tendencies of managers (Djankov et al., 2008; La Porta et al., 1998; Spamann, 2009). For 
example, Leuz, Nanda and Wysocki (2003) found that the ADR index relates negatively to 
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managerial use of earnings management to conceal poor firm performance, whereas 
Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra (2004) found that it positively relates to the implementation 
of codes of good governance.  
The presence of strong ADR makes it more difficult for managers to pursue 
M&As for self-serving purposes. Moreover, even if managers seek to pursue M&As for 
private benefit in high-ADR contexts, they are more likely to be blocked by legal 
constraints. Research on cross-border M&A activity suggests that ADR can be effective. 
Scholars found that firms from countries with better investor protection were more likely 
to acquire firms in countries where investor protection is weaker (Coffee, 1999; Rossi and 
Volpin, 2004). These findings imply that managers from strong ADR contexts search 
across borders for M&A opportunities in weaker ADR contexts, possibly to avoid strife 
with the well-protected minority shareholders of domestic targets. We therefore predict 
that M&A prevalence in a given country is negatively related to the strength of the legal 
measures that a country has taken to combat viceroy problems.  
Hypothesis 1a: The stronger the anti-director rights in a country, the lower the 
prevalence of M&As in that country. 
While governments design these legal measures deliberately to prevent managers 
from acting on their private interests, the institutions captured by the ADR index are also 
somewhat blunt instruments. When they are being wielded, they inevitably cause collateral 
damage; especially in the form of restricting the discretion managers need to push through 
value-creating initiatives (Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996; Mahoney, 1995). For example, 
when top managers make important corporate decisions such as M&As, they generally 
value high financial flexibility to make consequential decisions quickly (Graham and 
Harvey, 2001). Stronger ADR deprive top managers of this flexibility (Kusnadi and Wei, 
2011). Moreover, giving managers greater freedom to act on their own accord can help 
make them forego the ‗quiet life‘ (Hicks, 1935), and develop enterprising initiatives that 
are closer to the optimal risk-return frontier (Himmelberg et al., 1999; Li and Tang, 2010). 
However, stronger ADR also increases the opportunities for shareholders to vote on, and 
potentially hinder, decisions regarding important corporate matters, such as M&As 
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1997).  
Managers are thus not only likely to conduct fewer M&As in contexts where 
ADR are strong, they also face greater constraints when they do engage in M&As. Faced 
with strict ADR institutions, managers can exercise less discretion regarding M&A 
decisions in these jurisdictions (Finkelstein and Boyd, 1998). Curtailing the viceroy 
problem can therefore result in the unwanted side effect of making managers forego 
potentially profitable M&As. We propose that inhibiting this freedom can dissuade 
managers from acquiring potentially synergistic targets that could lead to superior 
shareholder value. In other words, the presence of strong ADR prevents managers from 
acquiring potentially lucrative targets. Thus, we propose that stronger legal institutions 
designed to curtail viceroy-like behavior simultaneously prevent managers from pursuing 
potentially lucrative M&As. Thus, we predict: 
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Hypothesis 1b: The stronger the anti-director rights in a country, the weaker the M&A – 
abnormal returns relationship. 
 
An institution-based view on M&As: Ameliorating the emperor problem 
Surprisingly, the second agency problem that potentially affects M&As – the 
principal-principal problem that we refer to as the emperor problem – has received much 
less attention from M&A scholars (cf. Young et al., 2008). This problem occurs when 
controlling shareholders wantonly expropriate minority shareholders. Some observers have 
suggested that concentrated ownership can be an effective countervailing power that has 
the potential to address viceroy problems because large and undiversified shareholders 
have strong incentives to thoroughly monitor and restrain self-interested managers 
(Himmelberg et al., 1999; Maug, 1998; McConnell and Servaes, 1990). However, 
concentrated shareholders may have self-interested motivations of their own, which are 
ultimately detrimental rather than beneficial to the interests of minority shareholders. This 
emperor problem can even be more destructive for minority shareholders than the viceroy 
problem (McConnell and Servaes, 1990; Morck, Shleifer and Vishny, 1988; Young et al., 
2008). Especially in contexts characterized by weak minority shareholder protection, such 
as in jurisdictions where the legislature, courts, and enforcement agencies are unable to 
check the power of economic elites, there may be strong incentives for controlling 
shareholders to engage in self-dealing. By transferring value from one organization they 
control to others in which they enjoy greater cash flow rights, controlling shareholders can 
expropriate the assets or profits of the former at the expense of its minority shareholders 
(Wruck, 1989). 
When controlling shareholders can use the cash flow rights of shares that they 
own to appropriate financial returns in excess of what they are entitled to, they are able to 
realize so-called private benefits of control (Dharwadkar et al., 2000; Dyck and Zingales, 
2004). These private benefits reflect a conflict of interest between controlling and minority 
shareholders, because such appropriation comes at the expense of minority shareholders‘ 
wealth and interests (Li and Qian, 2013; Young et al., 2008). The presence of private 
benefits of control is therefore an emblematic feature of the emperor problem (La Porta et 
al., 1998; La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Schleifer and Vishny, 1999). 
In the context of M&As, private benefits of control emerge when controlling 
shareholders use their influence to initiate M&As that are self-beneficial, in order to siphon 
off wealth from minority shareholders (Djankov et al., 2008; Enriques, 2000). Scholars 
have identified numerous means that enable controlling shareholders to expropriate 
minority shareholders. One frequently mentioned method for extracting private benefits is 
to have an acquiring firm that is fully under the control of one shareholder pay a significant 
premium for a target in which that shareholder has greater cash flow rights (Albuquerque 
and Schroth, 2010; Barclay and Holderness, 1989; Dyck and Zingales, 2004). This 
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involves a net transfer of wealth from the acquirer‘s non-controlling shareholders to the 
controlling shareholder.  
Majority shareholders also can extract private benefits of control in the post-
merger integration period. For example, through so-called ―tunneling‖, controlling 
shareholders transfer goods or assets to other entities they control at a price substantially 
below their market value (de Silanes et al., 2000). Controlling shareholders may also 
transfer losses from one organization to another unit under their control, in order to lower 
their private tax burdens (Conac, Enriques and Gelter, 2007). Acquiring another firm 
therefore enables controlling shareholders to transfer wealth from one entity to another, at 
the expense of minority shareholders. Moreover, when institutional shareholders have 
financial stakes in both bidding and target organization, they may have incentives to 
overpay in deals if their weighted average returns increase as a result (Bethel et al., 2009; 
Harford, Jenter, and Li, 2007). 
While the M&A literature has focused predominantly on the viceroy problem, law 
and finance scholars have investigated how nation states address emperor problems, 
notably through the cultivation of institutional countermeasures (La Porta et al., 1997; 
1998). Various countries have produced legal institutions that enforce minority shareholder 
rights and reduce information asymmetries, thereby constraining controlling parties and 
reducing the risk of self-dealing (Beck and Levine, 2008; Guillén and Capron, 2015). 
Similar to the ADR index, scholars have developed an index to capture the strength of the 
relevant legal institutions: the anti-self dealing (ASD) index (Djankov et al., 2008). This 
index consists of two components. The first includes legal means that prevent self-dealing 
ex-ante, such as the extent of obligatory disclosures regarding transactions, the necessity to 
obtain the approval of disinterested shareholders, and the requirement to obtain an 
independent review. The second component consists of ex-post countermeasures. These 
again include disclosure regulations, but also the potential to sue for damages and 
liabilities, the possibility of rescission, and access to evidence regarding any deals 
(Djankov et al., 2008). Law and finance scholars frequently employ the ASD index for 
example to establish the extent to which ASD measures can substitute for firm-level 
corporate governance (Renders, Gaeremynck and Sercu, 2010), to determine their 
consequences for investment efficiency in transparency-dependent industries (Dumev, 
Errunza and Molchanov, 2009), and to assess their effect on the cost of equity of publicly 
listed enterprises (Chen, Chen and Wei, 2009). 
Having the recourse to ASD measures provides minority shareholders with some 
assurances that their wealth will not be siphoned away after a takeover. New investors may 
not be willing to take up a financial interest in a potential takeover target if they believe 
that the risk of expropriation through private benefit extraction is high. Once a deal has 
been reached, however, the only remaining resort for invested parties is to rely on the legal 
system and its dedicated ASD provisions (Benos and Weisbach, 2004). If this system is 
weak, shareholders will have little insurance that their wealth will not be siphoned away 
after a takeover, and their willingness to put the organization up as a potential M&A target 
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will therefore be low. Since shareholders are presumably aware of this risk, they are much 
more likely to attempt blocking M&As that increase their exposure to these expropriation 
risks (Bethel et al., 2009). In response, potential target organizations from jurisdictions in 
which the risk of shareholder expropriation is high therefore sometimes choose to cross-list 
in countries offering stronger minority shareholder protection (Coffee, 1999; Stulz, 1999). 
This assures the shareholders of target organizations that their wealth will not be seized 
through acquisitions.  
Since the strategic actions of an organization create uncertainty for shareholders 
about future outcomes (Bergh, Connelly, Ketchen and Shannon, 2014), shareholders tend 
to look for observable indicators that help them to mitigate the uncertainty they face 
(Spence, 2002). Through these signals, shareholders can reduce the information 
asymmetry they face vis-à-vis the organization (Heil and Robertson, 1991). In the context 
of M&As, ASD laws provide target shareholders with signals that assure them that their 
wealth will not be expropriated (Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2004). One of the means 
through which ASD laws help to signal true acquirer intent is by necessitating various 
forms of disclosure, including the release of independent reviews and periodic filings 
(Djankov et al., 2008). ASD laws therefore help to reduce the level of information 
asymmetry that exists between buyer and target. 
We thus expect M&As to be less prevalent in countries where ASD measures are 
weaker (cf. John, Freund, Nguyen and Vasudevan, 2010). When the shareholders of target 
organizations have a higher fear of expropriation, the resistance they exhibit towards 
takeovers tends to be stronger (Li and Qian, 2013). Conversely, target shareholders will be 
more willing to accept takeovers in countries when there are greater constraints on 
controlling shareholders extracting private benefits (Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2004; 
Burns, Francis and Hasan, 2007). We therefore expect that stronger ASD measures 
facilitate the initiation of M&As, and increase their prevalence as an organizational growth 
mechanism. Thus, we predict: 
 
Hypothesis 2a: The stronger the anti-self-dealing laws in a country, the higher the 
prevalence of M&As. 
 
While the disclosure requirements in strong ASD jurisdictions might facilitate 
M&As, these requirements also extend to the broader market for corporate control and 
corporate assets, which might have implications for the profitability of acquisitions. 
Information asymmetries create differences between acquiring organizations, in terms of 
their capability to gather and interpret information regarding the future value of potential 
targets (Barney, 1988). In the absence of information asymmetries, similar expectations 
regarding target valuation will drive up stock prices of high-quality targets until the 
potential premium to be incurred by bidders approaches zero (Barney, 1988). Lower levels 
of information asymmetry are thus detrimental to the arbitrage and value creation 
opportunities facing experienced bidders (Capron and Shen, 2007), and post-merger 
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abnormal returns are therefore likely to be lower in contexts where ASD laws are strong. 
Contrastingly, bidders are likely to enjoy superior announcement returns in countries with 
weaker ASD laws, as a compensation for the higher agency and information asymmetry 
costs they face (Hagendorff, Collins and Keasey, 2008). 
Moreover, since there are more opportunities for self-dealing in weaker ASD 
jurisdictions, shareholders of acquiring firms tend to value M&A deals in these contexts 
more highly (John et al., 2010). Conversely, stricter disclosure rules limit the potential 
gains that acquirers might extract from M&As, which puts downward pressure on acquirer 
returns (Moeller and Schlingemann, 2005; Rossi and Volpin, 2004). We hence expect that 
a stronger ASD regime in a given country negatively impacts M&A performance. Thus, 
we predict: 
 
Hypothesis 2b: The stronger the anti-self-dealing laws in a country, the weaker the M&A – 
abnormal returns relationship. 
 
4.3 METHODOLOGY 
 
We relied on meta-analysis and various regression techniques to test our hypotheses. After 
consulting an influential prior meta-analysis on the topic (King et al., 2004), we set out to 
collect effect sizes capturing our focal relationships from primary studies. We then 
employed Hunter and Schmidt-type meta-analysis (HSMA; Hunter and Schmidt, 2015) to 
aggregate these effect sizes. We used two distinct methods to test our hypotheses. For 
Hypotheses 1a and 2a, we employ OLS regression to test the relationship between the 
institutions that constrain viceroy- and emperor-like behavior and M&A prevalence. We 
conducted these regressions with standard errors clustered by year to account for any 
potential uncontrolled heterogeneity in our data (Petersen, 2009). For Hypotheses 1b and 
2b we test the moderating effects of viceroy and emperor behavior-constraining 
institutions on the M&A–abnormal returns relationship with meta-analytic regression 
analysis (MARA; Gonzalez-Mulé and Aguinis, 2017; Lipsey and Wilson, 2001). MARA 
allows us to model the extant variation in institutional quality across all the national 
settings in our sample, assessing its conditioning effects on the associational strength of 
our focal relationship. 
 
Main variables 
To test our hypotheses, we needed a set of empirical indicators that capture the 
institutional measures nation states have taken to mitigate various sources of shareholder 
expropriation. These measures are commonly encapsulated with the anti-director-rights 
(ADR) and anti-self-dealing (ASD) indices. The ADR index (La Porta et al., 1998) has 
seen extensive use in the literature (e.g. Bris, Brisley and Cabolis, 2008; Guney, Ozkan 
and Ozkan, 2007; Leuz et al., 2003). However, the original index drew some criticisms 
about its validity, based on its ad hoc nature, its components, and the weight attached to 
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them (e.g., Graff, 2008; Pagano and Volpin, 2005; Spamann, 2009). In response to these 
criticisms, Djankov and associates (2008) created a revised ADR index, which is the 
version we use to capture measures against shareholder expropriation by managers.
32
 The 
revised index has been used widely in prior literature (e.g., Chaney, Faccio and Parsley, 
2011; Chen et al., 2009), and remains the most authoritative and most widely used 
operationalization of the ADR construct to date.  
We adopted our measure for the ASD, the construct that captures legal measures 
against minority shareholder expropriation by controlling shareholders, from Djankov and 
associates (2008) as well.
43
 These authors have suggested an anti-self-dealing measure 
consisting of various private enforcement mechanisms governing self-dealing transactions 
that regulate transaction disclosure, approval and litigation. The ASD index is widely used 
in the private benefits of control literature (e.g., Andrade and Chhaochharia, 2010; Haidar, 
2009). Scores on the revised ADR and ASD indices for all the countries in our sample can 
be found in Table I. 
To collect dependent variable data for our test of Hypotheses 1a and 2a, we relied 
on ThomsonOne, an online database that tracks mergers and acquisitions globally. We 
collected data regarding the number of M&As that occurred in each year for all 73 
countries in our dataset.  We log-transformed this variable to correct for the effects of 
potential outliers.  
To test Hypotheses 1b and 2b, we examined the strength of the M&A–abnormal 
returns relationship
5
. The latter construct is widely employed in the M&A literature (e.g. 
Chatterjee, Lubatkin, Schweiger and Weber, 1992; Godfrey, Merrill and Hansen, 2009; 
Martin and Sayrak, 2003), and captures the difference between actual and expected returns 
                                                 
3
 The revised ADR index as constructed by Djankov et al., consists of the following items: 
―vote by mail; obstacles to the actual exercise of the right to vote; minority representation 
on the Board of Directors through cumulative voting or proportional representation; an 
oppressed minority mechanism to seek redress in case of expropriation; pre-emptive rights 
to subscribe to new securities issued by the company; right to call a special shareholder 
meeting‖ (2008:453-454). 
 
4
 The ASD index as constructed by Djankov et al., consists of the following items: 
―approval by disinterested shareholders; disclosures by buyer; disclosures by the director;  
independent review; disclosure in periodic filings; standing to sue; recission; ease of 
holding the director liable; ease of holding the approving body liable; access to evidence‖ 
(2008:434). 
 
5
 Since the majority of the samples we include in our study do not make any 
distinction between mergers and acquisitions, we combine the two in a single meta-
analysis. This is in line with prior review works on the M&A literature, both 
empirically (e.g. Datta et al, 1992; King et al., 2004; Stahl and Voight, 2008) and 
conceptually (Ferreirra et al., 2014; Haleblian et al., 2009). 
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that accrue to shareholders as a result of the M&A event (Cording et al., 2010; Papadakis 
and Thanos, 2010). Our sample allows us to examine the M&A–abnormal returns 
relationship over various event windows. 
We controlled for several additional country-level factors to rule out confounding 
institutional effects. First, we included a GDP measure to correct for the relative size of the 
economy, since countries with larger economies are likely to harbor more M&As. Second, 
since firms from wealthier countries are more likely to engage in M&As, we controlled for 
GDP per capita (Rossi and Volpin, 2004). Since M&A activity is partially contingent on 
the availability of publicly listed targets, we also controlled for the size of the stock 
market, measured as the total value of listed companies (Erel, Liao and Weisbach, 2012). 
We collected all three measures from the World Bank Data center in logged current US 
dollars, to account for skewedness and inflation. Finally, we also controlled for the Rule of 
Law to capture baseline levels of institutional development (La Porta et al., 1998). This 
measure is empirically distinct from our measures of ADR and ASD (r = 0.28 and 0.21 
respectively). Rule of Law data was taken from the World Governance Indicators. Table 
4.1 presents country-level descriptives. 
 
Prevalence analysis 
To test Hypotheses 1a and 2a, suggesting that M&A prevalence is negatively 
influenced by ADR institutions, but positively influenced by ASD institutions, we 
performed a series of linear regressions. We conducted our regression analyses, clustered 
by year, using the cluster command in STATA, version 13.0, with the prevalence of 
M&As in a given year per country as our dependent variable. In these regressions, we 
control for log GDP, log GDP per capita, and logged stock market size, as well as for Rule 
of Law.  
 
Meta-Analysis: sample and coding 
To test Hypotheses 1b and 2b, we followed established guidelines for meta-analytical 
research in management (Lipsey and Wilson, 2001; Cortina, 2003; Hunter and Schmidt, 
2015). We collected primary studies investigating the relationship between M&A 
occurrence and abnormal returns through four distinct search strategies. First, we consulted 
prior literature reviews (Ferreira et al., 2014; Haleblian et al., 2009) and meta-analyses 
focusing on this topic (Datta et al., 1992; King et al., 2004; Stahl and Voight, 2008). 
Second, we searched multiple electronic databases (Google Scholar, JSTOR, EconLit and 
SSRN), using the following search terms: merger, mergers, acquisition, acquisitions, 
takeover, takeovers, M&A, M&As. Third, we manually searched leading journals in the 
fields of management, finance and economics. Fourth, we conducted supplementary 
searches in Google Scholar, using the aforementioned search terms in conjunction with the 
names of the 100 largest countries (e.g. ―acquisitions France‖ and ―takeover Canada‖), in 
order to capture the maximum amount of cross-national heterogeneity in our sample.  
Our initial search yielded 2341 studies. We then employed several inclusion 
criteria to decide whether to retain studies. Studies had to contain empirical data of 
samples that related to M&A processes and outcomes. We also only included studies that 
contained one or more samples consisting of only a single country, thereby excluding 
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studies relying on mixed-country samples and studies in which there was ambiguity about 
the countries contained in the dataset. Additionally, we excluded studies with a median 
sample year prior to 1970, as data on several important variables were not available for this 
early time period. After applying these criteria, many studies consisted predominantly of 
US samples. Since our hypotheses only involve cross-national institutional heterogeneity, 
we limited the inclusion of US samples to 125% of that of the second-most represented 
country (United Kingdom), by randomly selecting 16 studies with US samples. We then 
created a coding protocol that we used to extract all effect sizes between the variables of 
interest (Lipsey and Wilson, 2001). During the coding process, we had to drop several 
studies from our sample because they failed to report statistics like standard errors or z-
scores or because they did not report empirical results for our focal relationship. We then 
checked all studies for duplicate samples, removing smaller and older samples in case of 
substantial overlap (Wood, 2008).  
When we encountered studies including multiple measurements of our main 
effect, frequently due to reporting different event windows or multiple distinct home 
countries, we included all effects in our analyses. Bijmolt and Pieters (2001) have used 
Monte Carlo simulations to show that analyses including all available measures 
outperform those employing only single values per study, in terms of both accuracy of 
parameter retrieval and significance testing. This led to a sample of 93 unique studies with 
385 effect sizes. However, several of these effect sizes consisted of target or combined 
(acquirer and target) abnormal returns. We include all effect sizes in Table 4.2 to provide a 
broader picture of the M&A context in specific countries. In subsequent models, since our 
hypotheses are concerned with the abnormal returns of acquiring firms, we excluded target 
or combined abnormal returns. Our final sample therefore consists of 91 unique studies 
comprising a total of 288 effect sizes. 
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TABLE 4.1 Descriptives per country 
Country GDP
a 
GDP per 
capita
a 
Stock 
market 
size
a 
Rule of 
Law ASD ADR 
Argentina 11.07 3.57 9.99 -0.63 0.34 2.0 
Australia 11.35 4.13 11.29 1.74 0.76 4.0 
Austria 11.04 4.15 10.10 1.96 0.21 2.5 
Belgium 11.16 4.16 10.74 1.31 0.54 3.0 
Bolivia 9.68 2.86 8.83 -0.84 0.14 2.0 
Brazil 11.70 3.49 11.54 -0.44 0.27 5.0 
Bulgaria 10.24 3.32 8.51 -0.11 0.65 3.0 
Canada 11.62 4.19 11.66 1.79 0.64 4.0 
Chile 10.53 3.42 10.85 1.23 0.63 4.0 
China 11.62 2.59 11.94 -0.45 0.76 1.0 
Colombia 10.63 3.12 10.82 -0.47 0.57 3.0 
Croatia 10.49 3.83 9.69 0.08 0.25 2.5 
Czech Republic 10.84 3.83 10.12 0.86 0.33 4.0 
Denmark 10.98 4.26 10.40 2.00 0.46 4.0 
Ecuador 10.20 3.21 9.14 -1.07 0.08 2.0 
Egypt 10.55 2.82 11.06 -0.19 0.20 3.0 
El Salvador 9.72 3.02 9.28 -0.69 0.43 2.0 
Finland 10.86 4.17 10.60 1.90 0.46 3.5 
France 11.92 4.16 11.40 1.43 0.38 3.5 
Germany 12.07 4.17 11.51 1.75 0.28 3.5 
Ghana 9.71 2.57 8.88 -0.01 0.67 5.0 
Greece 10.87 3.87 11.11 0.84 0.22 2.0 
Hong Kong 10.71 3.96 11.10 1.51 0.96 5.0 
Hungary 10.78 3.77 10.43 0.92 0.18 2.0 
Iceland 9.65 4.25 N/a 1.85 0.26 4.5 
India 11.42 2.50 11.79 0.11 0.58 5.0 
Indonesia 10.94 2.71 10.74 -0.68 0.65 4.0 
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TABLE 4.1 Descriptives per country (continued) 
Country GDP
a 
GDP per 
capita
a 
Stock 
market 
size
a 
Rule of 
Law ASD ADR 
Ireland 10.56 4.01 10.94 1.71 0.79 5.0 
Israel 10.61 3.94 10.38 0.81 0.73 4.0 
Italy 11.81 4.06 11.86 0.44 0.42 2.0 
Jamaica 9.63 3.27 9.40 -0.44 0.35 4.0 
Japan 12.27 4.19 12.12 1.33 0.50 4.5 
Jordan 9.65 3.14 10.61 0.45 0.16 1.0 
Kazakhstan 10.46 3.27 9.80 -0.89 0.48 4.0 
Kenya 9.87 2.54 9.44 -0.98 0.21 2.0 
Korea, Rep. 11.20 3.58 10.85 1.02 0.47 4.5 
Latvia 10.01 3.64 N/a 0.71 0.32 4.0 
Lithuania 10.18 3.64 N/a 0.67 0.36 4.0 
Luxembourg 9.98 4.39 9.97 1.75 0.28 2.0 
Malaysia 10.57 3.33 10.87 0.50 0.95 5.0 
Mexico 11.38 3.47 10.39 -0.54 0.17 3.0 
Morocco 10.35 2.97 N/a -0.27 0.56 2.0 
Netherlands 11.37 4.20 11.14 1.77 0.20 2.5 
New Zealand 10.56 4.02 10.36 1.83 0.95 4.0 
Nigeria 10.54 2.58 9.98 -1.06 0.43 4.0 
Norway 10.94 4.31 10.54 1.92 0.42 2.0 
Pakistan 10.55 2.55 10.17 -0.88 0.41 5.0 
Panama 9.80 3.42 9.40 -0.21 0.16 3.0 
Peru 10.43 3.12 10.23 -0.78 0.45 2.0 
Philippines 10.59 2.83 10.57 -0.48 0.22 4.0 
Poland 11.22 3.64 10.52 0.37 0.26 2.0 
Portugal 10.73 3.74 10.81 0.98 0.44 2.5 
Romania 10.66 3.31 9.47 -0.10 0.44 5.0 
Russia 11.65 3.49 N/a -0.95 0.44 4.0 
Singapore 10.43 3.95 10.80 1.65 1.00 5.0 
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TABLE 4.1 Descriptives per country (continued) 
Country GDP
a 
GDP per 
capita
a 
Stock 
market 
size
a 
Rule of 
Law ASD ADR 
Slovak Republic 10.48 3.76 9.17 0.45 0.29 3.0 
South Africa 10.95 3.42 11.12 0.06 0.81 5.0 
Spain 11.50 3.91 11.34 1.13 0.37 5.0 
Sri Lanka 9.89 2.68 9.46 0.15 0.29 4.0 
Sweden 11.22 4.28 10.76 1.88 0.33 3.5 
Switzerland 11.37 4.53 11.26 1.84 0.27 3.0 
Taiwan N/a N/a N/a 0.75 0.56 3.0 
Thailand 10.75 3.03 10.81 -0.09 0.81 4.0 
Tunisia 10.02 3.14 9.47 0.17 0.15 3.0 
Turkey 11.03 3.32 10.79 0.02 0.43 3.0 
Uganda 9.57 2.35 7.83 -0.38 0.41 3.0 
Ukraine 10.74 3.05 N/a -0.75 0.08 3.0 
United 
Kingdom 11.87 4.11 11.82 1.68 0.95 5.0 
United States 12.68 4.28 12.62 1.58 0.65 3.0 
Uruguay 9.96 3.48 8.78 0.55 0.18 1.0 
Venezuela 10.77 3.50 9.84 -1.55 0.09 1.0 
Vietnam 10.39 2.53 N/a -0.41 N/a N/a 
Zimbabwe 9.76 2.79 9.28 -1.78 0.39 4.0 
Table 4.1 presents the ASD and ADR plus additional descriptives for 73 countries. All 
descriptives are composed by taking the average of available data for the period 1970-
2007. Subsequent analyses in this paper use year-specific data. 
a
logged values in current USD 
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Meta-analytic procedures 
We build on the work of King and his colleagues (2004) on the general 
profitability of M&As, and provide an updated overview of empirical M&A results that 
incorporates more recent, and especially more globally dispersed work. We used HSMA 
(Hunter and Schmidt, 2015) to generate descriptive results. HSMA allows us to establish 
overall and country-level estimates for the M&A-performance relationship and their 
corresponding confidence intervals. We calculated effect sizes by taking the mean of the 
weighted sample size correlations for each study. Since this generates positive and 
negative sampling errors that cancel each other out, this approach offers a more precise 
estimation of mean associations (Hunter and Schmidt, 2015). We then constructed 95% 
confidence intervals around our estimates (Whitener, 1990). We report the Q test for all 
subsamples, to detect possible heterogeneity in these effect size distributions (Cochran, 
1954). Since these tests only indicate the presence or absence of heterogeneity, and as the 
power of the test is understated for small samples and overstated for large samples (Huedo-
Medina, Sánchez-Meca, Marín-Martínez and Botella, 2006), we also calculated the I
2
 for 
all our estimates. The I
2
 consists of a transformation of H, the square root of χ2 divided by 
its degrees of freedom (Higgins and Thompson, 2002). This operationalization has the 
benefit of describing ―the percentage of total variation across studies that is due to 
heterogeneity rather than chance‖ (Higgins, Thompson, Deeks and Altman, 2003: 558).  
We used random-effects HSMA, as this accounts for potential heterogeneity in 
the distribution of effect sizes, which is present in the majority of our samples 
(Raudenbush and Bryk, 2002). Table 4.2 presents descriptive results, including acquirer 
abnormal returns, target abnormal returns, and combined abnormal returns. For example, 
our study includes 30 samples involving Chinese firms, representing a combined total of 
12276 firms. We find that for Chinese M&As, the mean effect is 0.11 with a standard error 
of 0.018, significant at the 0.001 level. The Q test indicates significant heterogeneity, while 
the I
2
 index shows that 67% of the total variability amongst Chinese effect sizes drives 
from true heterogeneity (not sampling error) between studies. 
We employed MARA to test Hypotheses 1b and 2b. MARA is a technique that 
uses effect sizes as the dependent variable, and models the independent variables in the 
regression as moderating effects of the main relationship (Lipsey and Wilson, 2001). 
Specifically, we regressed the associational strength of the M&A—acquirer abnormal 
returns relationship on ASD and ADR. MARA is a weighted least squares (WLS) 
regression technique that models extant heterogeneity in the effect size distribution, in our 
case tracing it to institutional effects (Lipsey and Wilson, 2001). Consistent with our 
analysis on M&A prevalence, we controlled for log GDP, log GDP per capita, logged size 
of the stock market, and Rule of Law. We conducted all analyses in Rstudio, version 
1.0.44, using the ―metaphor‖ package.  
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 We also controlled for publication artifacts, including publication status 
(published article or working paper), publication year, and journal status (based on the UT 
Dallas top journals list). We found that publication status has a positive significant result, 
indicating the presence of a file drawer problem in M&A studies (Rosenthal, 1979). We 
similarly identified a positive significant effect for publication year, but found no effect for 
journal status. We conducted several additional analyses to triangulate the potential 
existence of publication bias (Harrison, Banks, Pollack, O‘Boyle and Short, 2017). First, 
we examined the potential presence of publication bias by inspecting r-based funnel plots 
of effect and sample sizes. These plots exhibited an asymmetrical pattern, which indicates 
the potential presence of publication bias (Duval, 2005). Funnel plots from a cumulative 
meta-analysis also revealed a positive skew in the data, again indicating a possible 
publication bias (Borenstein, Hedges, Higgins and Rothstein, 2009). In addition, we also 
conducted a moderate selection analysis, and found a strong significant indication that 
studies with large p values are underrepresented (Hedges and Vevea, 2005). However, an 
analysis with the trim-and-fill methodology (Duval, 2005) indicated that no studies were 
missing from our estimation. In addition, we computed the Fail-Safe N (Rosenthal, 1979), 
and found that 68,228 studies with an average z-value of zero need to be added to make the 
combined effect statistically insignificant. Additional follow-up analyses on the potential 
for publication bias revealed that publication bias is largely absent in commonly employed 
research settings, such as China, the United Kingdom and the United States. Overall, our 
findings indicate mixed results regarding the presence of a potential publication bias, but 
lean towards the presence of publication bias, particularly in infrequently used research 
settings. 
 
4.4 RESULTS 
 
Table 4.3 presents the results for our linear regression analysis on the prevalence of 
M&As, captured in hypotheses 1a and 2a. Hypothesis 1a predicted that the ADR index 
would have a negative effect on M&A prevalence, whereas Hypothesis 2a predicted that 
the ASD index would have a positive effect. Model 1 reports control variables, Models 2 
and 3 respectively include the direct effects of the ADR and ASD indices, and Model 4 
contains both indices. Model 2 shows that the ADR index has a negative and significant 
effect on M&A prevalence, while Model 3 indicates a positive significant effect for the 
ASD index. The full model is consistent with these findings. Hypotheses 1a and 2a are 
therefore supported.  
Table 4.4 contains the HSMA results for the M&A–abnormal returns relationship. 
The main relationship is positive and significant. Following King et al. (2004), we 
subdivided our dependent variable based on different event windows. We find that the 
positive significant effect is present in all cases except for the 180+ days event window, 
where the effect becomes insignificant. A likely explanation for this finding is that market 
forecasts captured by abnormal returns become less reliable as a predictor over time, due to 
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the effect of confounding events (Schoenberg, 2006). Moreover, stock-based performance 
indicators operate under the assumption that the expected stock price is stable, an 
assumption that is more likely to be violated as the event window is lengthened (Andrade, 
Mitchell and Stafford, 2001). Similar to King and colleagues (2004), we also find that 
target abnormal returns for day 0 are positive and significant, and that they are more 
positive than those for the acquiring organization. These results confirm prior findings that 
target shareholders, due to price premiums, generally enjoy returns that are superior to 
those of acquirer shareholders (Huang and Walking, 1987).  
Table 4.5 presents the MARA results for Hypotheses 1b and 2b. The results show 
some sample attrition due to variables with missing observations. We therefore decided to 
collapse all acquirer abnormal returns into a single variable to ensure an adequate sample 
size. Model 1 contains control variables, Models 2 and 3 include the ADR and ASD 
indices respectively, and Model 4 combines both indices. We computed the intra-class 
correlation coefficient, which showed that 27% of the overall variance in our sample 
results from between-country differences. With regard to our hypotheses, the results 
indicate strong support for both, as the regression parameters for both indices are negative 
and significant in all instances.  
We also conducted a marginal difference analysis to determine whether strong 
ASD institutions are more destructive for shareholder wealth than strong ADR institutions, 
as prior literature has suggested (McConnell and Servaes, 1990; Morck et al., 1988; Young 
et al., 2008). Our findings (not reported due to space constraints) indicate that this is 
indeed the case, as a one standard deviation increase from the mean resulted in a stronger 
loss of shareholder wealth in the case of ASD institutions (-0.054, p = 0.001) than in the 
case of ADR institutions (-0.042, p = 0.05).  
 
Post-hoc supplementary analyses 
We conducted several post-hoc analyses to explore unhypothesized but potentially 
important moderating effects. First, we expected stronger results for our M&A-abnormal 
returns hypotheses (1b and 2b) for publicly listed firms, as the higher levels of shareholder 
dispersion in such firms make expropriation a more salient issue. As our sample did not 
include sufficient studies that only contained private targets, our analysis is restricted to a 
comparison between the subsample that includes only publicly listed firms and the full 
sample that includes both private and public target firms. Second, we expected the effects 
of constraining institutions to be contingent on the target being domestic or cross-border. 
As far as data availability allowed us to explore these issues, we conducted several 
additional HSMAs that explore these effects. We focused on distinct subsets based on 
whether targets were publicly listed, domestic and/or cross-border. The results of these 
analyses are presented in Table 4.6. They show that the focal relationship is fairly 
consistent and remains positive and significant across all subgroups.  
We also observed that the abnormal returns of cross-border M&As are higher 
than those of domestic M&As in the day 0 event window, but lower in the subsequent  
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event window. However, since our analysis does not allow us to control for the success 
rate of M&As, and given the file drawer problem we identified, this finding could be the 
result of a statistical artifact. Investors likely anticipate that cross-border acquisitions are 
more difficult to complete, resulting in lower price premiums and potentially higher 
abnormal returns for the M&As that do manage to be successful, due to a discount for the 
increased risk. The lower long-term abnormal returns are subsequently more in line with 
prior findings that suggest that cross-border M&As perform more poorly than domestic 
M&As in the long run, due to acquirers‘ inability to value and capture synergies in cross-
border M&As correctly (Moeller and Schlingemann, 2004). 
In additional MARAs, we introduced the ASD and ADR indices as moderating 
variables in different subsamples (see Table VII). Results show that the effects for the 
subsample containing only public targets (Table 4.7a) are stronger than those for our total 
sample. We interpret this as further support for our hypotheses. Private targets are 
characterized by higher levels of information asymmetry, due to the stricter rules 
governing public disclosure of information for listed firms. In line with our argument for 
Hypothesis 2b, information asymmetry increases the potential for value-creation in M&A 
deals involving private targets, as there is more private information to exploit (Capron and 
Shen, 2007).   
Table 4.7b and 4.7c provide the results for our domestic and foreign target 
subsamples respectively. When we compare both full models, the tables show that ADR 
has a stronger negative moderating effect for foreign targets than for domestic targets. 
Apparently, when managers engage in empire building, they are more likely to target 
foreign acquisitions (Aybar and Ficici, 2009). Foreign acquisitions are therefore more 
likely to be scrutinized than domestic acquisitions, further limiting managers‘ ability to 
engage in value-creating transactions.  
Additionally, ASD has a stronger positive moderating effect for foreign targets 
than for domestic targets. In cross-border mergers, the target usually adopts the governance 
standards and practices of the acquiring firm (Bris and Cabolis, 2008). Moreover, when a 
foreign firm is 100% acquired, it by law adopts the nationality of the acquiring firm, and 
therefore becomes subjected to the shareholder protection rights of the acquiring country 
(Bris, Brisley and Cabolis, 2008). If a cross-border M&A therefore occurs between an 
acquiring country with low shareholder protection rights and a target country with higher 
shareholder protection, the acquirer will likely have to pay a higher premium to 
compensate the target shareholders for surrendering their protection rights (Bris and 
Cabolis, 2008). Conversely, higher protection rights are likely to be a source of value for 
target shareholders, thereby lowering the required premium when the acquisition is in the 
direction of high to low shareholder protection rights. These findings thus provide further 
support for our hypotheses. 
  
75 
 
 
76 
 
 
 
77 
 
  
78 
 
4.5 DISCUSSION 
 
Our study highlights the importance of the institutional context for the investigation of 
both the prevalence and gains to shareholder value of M&As. In an effort to understand 
why M&As lead to gains or losses, research predominantly focused on the dyadic 
relationship between acquired and acquiring organizations, while often overlooking the 
role of the broader external context in which acquisitions are embedded (Haleblian et al., 
2009). The current study indicates that there is value in complementing firm-level research 
designs with more attention to the institutional context in which M&As are conducted.  
Specifically, we show that the institutional measures taken by nation states to 
combat agency problems have ulterior effects on M&A prevalence and performance. In 
our study, we accounted for unforeseen side effects that allowed us to explain country-
level heterogeneity in M&A prevalence and the M&A–abnormal returns relationship. 
Including ADR and ASD increased the explained variance beyond the baseline model with 
0.05 for M&A prevalence and 0.03 for abnormal returns. This increase translates to nearly 
1400 deals or $200 billion in terms of combined transaction value for the year 2015 alone 
(SDC, 2017). The immediate implication of this finding is that the presence of legal 
measures curtailing viceroy- and emperor-type behaviors does not have an unequivocally 
positive impact, and that careful evaluation is required before jurisdictions consider 
implementing or strengthening such measures. Our research thereby contributes to the 
emergent M&A literature that considers how institutional characteristics shape the M&A 
context (e.g., Clougherty, 2005; Capron and Guillen, 2009).  
In particular, our first contribution comes from highlighting that while the viceroy 
problem involving managerial opportunism in M&As is indeed a salient issue, it is not a 
universal one. Instead, our understanding of this problem demands contextualization, as 
the prevalence of this issue is highly contingent on the external institutional context. We 
find that when the institutional context addresses potential principal-agent problems, the 
prevalence of M&As decreases. This suggests that managerial empire building can be 
contained by means of dedicated legal measures. However, our findings also indicate that 
in contexts where anti-director rights are strongly developed, post-M&A abnormal returns 
tends to be lower. The implementation of legal measures that address agency problems 
seems to come with a side-effect of overly restrictive checks on managerial discretion. As 
a consequence, managers are curbed in correctly identifying and pursuing lucrative targets. 
Contrary to prior beliefs, the implementation of anti-director measures can therefore 
actually be counterproductive, as they tend to decrease rather than increase the shareholder 
value in the M&A deals that do go through. In this case, implementing institutions to 
restrict managerial freedom not only limits the gains made by managers, but also by 
shareholders.  
 Second, our study also emphasizes the importance of the emperor problem, a 
frequently neglected issue that negatively affects post-M&A abnormal returns because it 
involves expropriation by controlling shareholders. Prior research has shown that 
controlling shareholders can act as an effective countermeasure to viceroy problems, as 
these shareholders have strong incentives to engage in controlling and monitoring 
managerial action (Holderness, 2009). Yet their presence can also lead to a new set of 
problems, as controlling shareholders may have incentives to take advantage of minority 
shareholders. We highlighted this issue empirically by our marginal difference analysis, 
where we showed that anti-self-dealing measures are more destructive for shareholder 
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wealth than anti-director rights. Using M&As as a vehicle, majority owners have a variety 
of tools at their disposal, such as tunneling, transfer pricing, and takeover premiums, all 
allowing them to siphon wealth away from minority shareholders, either through the M&A 
deal itself or in the post-merger phase.  
Similar to ADR, there are institutional measures to be taken against these issues, 
in the form of anti-self-dealing laws. Our results show that stronger ASD laws actually 
increase the prevalence of M&As. This indicates that the presence of such laws can 
provide shareholders of targeted firms with assurances that their wealth is relatively safe 
from post-merger expropriation. Shareholders are therefore generally more amicable to 
being acquired in contexts with high ASD. This increases the frequency in which M&As 
are used as a corporate growth mechanism. Interestingly however, the presence of these 
laws simultaneously also lowers the overall predictions regarding the performance of 
M&As. This indicates that strong ASD laws lower the information asymmetries that might 
create opportunities for value creation (Capron and Shen, 2007). Conversely, bidders that 
face higher levels of information asymmetries are compensated for the potential costs they 
might face as a result of this uncertainty (Hagendorff et al., 2008). Moreover, the absence 
of strong ASD laws facilitates the bidder‘s opportunities for self-dealing, and makes 
potential targets in these jurisdictions more attractive (John et al., 2010).  
Our third contribution comes from capitalizing on further empirical research on 
M&As that enabled us to extend earlier meta-analyses of the M&A literature (Datta et al. 
1992; King et al. 2004; Stahl and Voigt, 2008). These earlier meta-analyses were revealing 
in particular because they showed that many frequently hypothesized firm-level factors did 
not explain much variance in M&A performance. More than a decade after the publication 
of the seminal study by King and associates (2004), M&A research has blossomed further, 
and we were able to compile a meta-analysis with samples from a much more diverse set 
of countries. This geographically more diverse approach showed positive results from 
M&A activity, when examined on a global scale. Specifically, we found a strongly 
significant mean effect of 0.12 for the M&A-abnormal returns association, when exploring 
the largest possible set of effect sizes. More importantly, however, by combining multiple 
single-country studies in a single multiple-country study, we demonstrate how many of the 
firm-level factors identified by King and co-authors are critically conditioned by 
contextual institutional factors. We hope our study and the findings inspire new pathways 
for future comparative M&A studies. 
 
Limitations and Future Research 
The results from our meta-analysis have to be interpreted in light of several 
limitations. First, one of the main independent variables we employed for our analysis is 
the ADR index, and this index is not without criticism (e.g., Graff, 2008; Pagano and 
Volpin, 2005; Spamann, 2009). However, the revised ADR index constructed by Djankov 
and associates (2008) addressed these criticisms by providing an updated version. Since 
this revised index has been widely adopted in the corporate governance literature (e.g., 
Chaney et al., 2011; Chen et al., 2009; John et al., 2010; Marosi and Massoud, 2008), we 
feel justified in employing it as one of our explanatory variables, especially in the absence 
of other broadly accepted measurements.  
Second, ADR and ASD indices are time-invariant variables, and it is reasonable 
to assume that they are susceptible to institutional development and, occasionally, decline. 
Yet, while legal institutions often change more rapidly than cultural institutions like norms 
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and values, they still tend to change much slower than political institutions, as their 
effectiveness is dependent on their acceptance and legitimacy in society (Roland, 2004). 
The primary studies included in our work have median sampling years ranging from 1970 
to 2007. Since this is a relatively short time frame for institutional change to occur, we 
expect that the time-invariant nature of our measures will not have a major influence on 
our results.  
Third, due to the meta-analytic nature of our data, we were unable to control for 
firm-level variables that might capture specific risks associated with an M&A transaction, 
and therefore influence realized abnormal returns. For example, high levels of ownership 
concentration can pose a higher risk of expropriation for minority shareholders. However, 
such heightened risk levels could be recompensed by increasing the premiums offered to 
minority shareholders. Organizations can also choose to disclose more information or 
impose higher levels of accountability than legally required in institutionally weak 
environments. These actions can act as firm-specific signaling mechanisms that allow 
organizations to reduce information asymmetries and their associated risk for minority 
shareholders.  
Fourth, our measure of M&A performance is restricted to operationalizations of 
abnormal returns. The focus on expected shareholders gains or losses in this 
operationalization runs the risk of not fully capturing the actual returns earned by the firms 
(Cording et al., 2010). While other, predominantly accounting-based operationalizations of 
M&A performance are also commonly employed, such as ROA, ROE, or sales growth, we 
found that our sample of studies did not include sufficient observations to employ these 
alternative operationalizations. However, even though abnormal returns only capture the 
difference between expected and actual gains to shareholders, the large body of literature 
that employed this measure as its sole dependent variable indicates that this construct is 
sufficiently interesting to study in and of itself.  
Fifth, our study could only shed limited light on the role ADR and ASD 
institutions play in cross-border acquisitions due to sample size restrictions. An interesting 
question is what the effect will be of substantial differences in institutional development 
between target and acquirer home nations. Following the theorizing laid down in our 
hypotheses, targets from less developed jurisdictions may perceive the potential M&A 
transaction as a way to ameliorate viceroy and emperor problems, which should increase 
M&A likelihood and decrease target premiums. Inversely, targets from more developed 
nations will likely resist transactions involving bidders from contexts with weaker ADR 
and ASD provisions, resulting in lower M&A prevalence and higher target premiums. 
These conjectures might be tested in future research.        
Our study also harbors other opportunities for future research.  First, the notion 
that the viceroy problem is at least partially context-dependent has an important bearing on 
M&A research.  For example, prior research has made a strong case that managers vary 
considerably in their approach to M&A decisions, contingent on hubris (Hayward and 
Hambrick, 1997) or narcissism and other personality dimensions (e.g., Chatterjee and 
Hambrick, 2007; Malhotra, Reus, Zhu and Roelofsen, 2017).  Our study suggests that the 
institutional context may not only influence the extent to which CEOs can pursue self-
interests, it can also restrain CEOs in terms of flexibility or speed in decision-making. We 
thus expect that there will be salient interactions between institutional factors and CEO 
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personality characteristics. It will be interesting to bring in more nuances on the ways in 
which the institutional context influences managers‘ influence over the M&A process. 
Second, and perhaps even more important for future research, is the finding that 
the emperor problem generally has a stronger effect than the viceroy problem, and it seems 
to be more critical in certain countries than in others.  We still need a lot more research in 
general about the role of different types of owners in relation to M&A initiation and 
outcomes.  For example, some research has already begun to reveal that leaders of family 
firms seek to retain control for their offspring by using M&As as a vehicle for 
diversification (Miller, Le Breton-Miller and Lester, 2010). This ownership influence 
could depend on the institutional context that is emphasized in this study; we expect the 
influence of different types of owners to vary depending on the ASD laws that characterize 
a country. 
Third, while our study shows the impact of the institutional environment on 
M&As, the results from our analyses reveals that significant levels of variance remain 
unexplained. These findings tie in with the observation by Haleblian et al. (2009) that our 
current understanding of the broader context in which M&As are conducted is still lacking. 
Ferreira and colleagues (2014) came to a similar conclusion in their bibliographic review 
of the M&A literature, and also called for more studies that account for the institutional 
context. Our study provides some empirical support that these suggestions are justified, 
and we would like to echo the call for more papers that incorporate institutional 
characteristics in their analysis, in order to further explain the variance in findings of the 
M&A literature. 
Fourth, due to the increase in breadth of research settings employed for M&A 
research, our study was able to draw on a larger sample of countries than prior meta-
analyses. It is encouraging to observe that over time, the research settings that are 
employed are becoming increasingly diversified, not just as a verification of the 
generalizability of earlier findings in other contexts, but also as fertile ground to test new 
hypotheses. However, our analysis still identified the presence of potential publication 
bias, particularly for research on countries outside of commonly examined settings such as 
China, the United Kingdom and the United States. This implies that while progress is 
being made, further examination of how different empirical contexts shape the M&A 
process remains warranted. 
 
Conclusion 
Scholars are increasingly becoming aware of the crucial role that the institutional 
context plays in conditioning the outcomes of M&A processes. With this awareness 
however, comes the growing realization that there is still much to be explored, as many 
important questions remain unanswered (e.g., Capron and Guillén, 2009; Ferreira et al., 
2014; Zhang, Zhou and Ebbers, 2011). In this paper, we addressed one of these questions, 
namely how institutions that seek to address viceroy and emperor problems spill over to 
affect M&A outcomes. In our study, we conducted a thorough meta-analysis that contained 
country samples spanning across the globe, and found some answers that shed light on this 
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issue. While these institutions may curtail the empire-building tendencies of managers and 
promote M&A activity by building a foundation of transparency and accountability, they 
have the ulterior effect of hampering shareholder value post-M&A. Our results reveal that 
these institutions represent a double-edged sword, and prompts an evaluation of which 
goals are to be prioritized – realizing superior organizational performance or protecting 
shareholders from expropriation? 
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SUMMARY 
 
Our comprehension of how organizations operate is not complete without accounting for 
the role of context. While a lot of research has been conducted on how organizations 
should respond to their environment, we know comparatively little about how the 
environment affects the behavior and decision making of organizations. In this 
dissertation, I therefore investigate the interplay between organizations and their context 
from the perspective of what context means for organizational strategies. Since both 
current and past conditions can have an effect on organizations, I chose to include a 
historical as well as a contemporary approach in my work. In particular, I draw on and 
contribute to theories of environmental imprinting and institutional theory to investigate 
how context affects (1) the internationalization behavior of EMEs, (2) the future 
profitability of organizations founded during times of hardship, and (3) M&A deal 
propensity and profitability. 
 The findings from these three empirical studies indicate that context has a 
significant impact on various organizational outcomes. Context provides a propensity for 
firms to pursue particular strategic options, through (dis)-incentivizing one choice over 
another. Differences in founding conditions can stimulate the development of certain 
capabilities that can later be used as competitive advantages for particular strategies, while 
contemporary conditions can directly affect strategic choices through incentivizing 
mechanisms. In particular, the first study showed that differences in internationalization 
behavior that we perceive across EMEs can in part be explained through heterogeneity in 
founding conditions. In a similar vein, the second study demonstrated differences in firm 
performance are partially explained by the hardship organizations experience during their 
time of founding, and the capabilities they develop because of it. The third study showed 
how institutions geared towards protecting shareholders reduce not only the number, but 
also the profitability of mergers and acquisitions.  
 Jointly, the findings in my dissertation emphasize the importance that a 
proper attribution and analysis of the role context has for the field of management. Not 
accounting for context introduces a variety of problems for research, from biased findings 
to hindering the generalizability of suggestions and predictions. By contribution to a better 
understanding of our environment and how organizations are affected by it, I provide 
nuance and richness to our existing theorizing and analysis of organizational outcomes. I 
hope that future work continues to explore and unearth the depths of this fascinating aspect 
of our society, and make the world a better understood place because of it. 
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SAMENVATTING 
 
Ons begrip van hoe organisaties functioneren is niet compleet zonder rekening te houden 
met de rol van context. Hoewel er veel onderzoek is gedaan naar hoe organisaties het beste 
kunnen reageren op de omgeving waar binnen ze opereren, weten we relatief weinig over 
het tegenovergestelde effect: hoe de omgeving het gedrag en de besluitvorming van 
organisaties beïnvloedt. In dit proefschrift onderzoek ik daarom de interactie tussen 
organisaties en hun context vanuit het perspectief van wat context betekent voor de 
strategieën die een organizatie implementeert. Omdat zowel huidige als vroegere condities 
een effect kunnen hebben op organisaties, heb ik ervoor gekozen om zowel een historische 
als een hedendaagse benadering in mijn werk op te nemen. In het bijzonder maak ik 
gebruik van en draag ik bij aan theorieën over inprenten en instituties om te onderzoeken 
hoe context van invloed is (1) het internationaliseringsgedrag van opkomende 
marketeconomieën, (2) de winstgevendheid van organisaties die zijn opgericht in tijden 
van schaarste, en (3) de frequent en winstgevendheid van overnames. 
 De bevindingen van deze drie empirische studies geven aan dat context een 
significante invloed heeft op verschillende organisatorische uitkomsten. Context creeërt 
voor bedrijven de neiging om bepaalde strategische opties na te streven, door de ene keuze 
boven de andere aan te moedigen. Verschillen in condities ten tijde van oprichting kunnen 
de ontwikkeling van bepaalde capaciteiten en vaardigheden stimuleren die later voor 
bepaalde strategieën competitieve voordelen op kunnen leveren, terwijl hedendaagse 
omstandigheden strategische keuzes rechtstreeks kunnen beïnvloeden door middel van 
stimulerende mechanismen. In mijn dissertatie toont de eerste studie dat de verschillen in 
internationalisatiegedrag die we waar kunnen nemen in opkomende markteconomieën 
gedeeltelijk verklaard kunnen worden door heterogeniteit in condities tijdens oprichting 
van de organizatie. Op een vergelijkbare manier verklaart de tweede studie verschillen in 
bedrijfswinstgevendheid door de capaciteiten die organizaties ontwikkelen als gevolg van 
schaarste tijdens hun oprichting. De derde studie toont aan dat instellingen die zich richten 
op het beschermen van aandeelhouders niet alleen het aantal, maar ook de 
winstgevendheid van fusies en overnames kunnen verminderen. 
 Gezamenlijk benadrukken de bevindingen in mijn proefschrift het belang van een 
goede attributie en analyse van de rol van context voor de bedrijfskunde. Als de context 
niet goed begrepen wordt kan dat zorgen voor allerlei problemen binnen het onderzoek, 
van selectieve uitkomsten tot belemmeren voor de generaliseerbaarheid van de 
bevindingen. Door bij te dragen aan een beter begrip van onze omgeving en wat dit 
betekent voor organisaties creeër ik nuance en inzicht voor onze bestaande theorieën en 
analyses over bedrijfsresultaten. Ik hoop dat toekomstige werk dit fascinerende aspect van 
onze samenleving zal blijven uitdiepen en de wereld daardoor een beter begrepen plaats zal 
maken. 
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